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Abstract
In a pair of cases declaring a “major questions” exception to Chevron deference,
the Supreme Court held that executive agencies may not implement major policy
changes without explicit authorization from Congress. But in Massachusetts v.
EPA, the Court unceremoniously killed its “major questions” rule, requiring the
EPA to implement one such major policy change. Because the scholarly literature to date has failed to discern a worthy justification for the “major questions”
rule, the academy might be tempted to celebrate the rule’s death. This Article,
however, argues that the rule ought to be mourned and, indeed, reincarnated. It
offers a “non-interference” justification for the “major questions” exception, arguing that the rule should apply whenever an agency enters debate in a regulatory
regime to which Congress is actively considering legislative changes. The purpose of the rule, then, is to prevent agencies from altering the regulatory backdrop
against which Congress is negotiating, and the purpose of judicial enforcement of
a “major questions” rule is to restore the pre-interference regulatory reality so that
congressional negotiations can pick up where they left off. This understanding of
the rule explains and justifies the two “major questions” cases, but it cannot explain or justify Massachusetts v. EPA. The Article therefore argues that the “major
questions” holding in Massachusetts v. EPA is wrong and should be rejected.
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Reincarnating the “Major Questions” Exception to Chevron Deference
as a Doctrine of Non-Interference
(Or Why Massachusetts v. EPA Got it Wrong)
INTRODUCTION
In Massachusetts v. EPA1 (the Supreme Court’s recent foray into the
global warming debate), the Court dealt a fatal blow to a fledgling, though controversial, doctrine: the “major questions” exception to Chevron2 deference.3
Admittedly, the Court’s decision in Massachusetts is consistent with a
simplistic view of the “major questions” rule. As it had done in the seminal “major questions” case, FDA v. Brown & Williamson,4 the Court in Massachusetts
identified the central issue as a major one and refused deference to the agency’s
handling of that issue. The Court thus seemed to hold, as it had in Brown & Williamson, that the Chevron framework was inapplicable in Massachusetts because
the question at issue was a major one. On that very basic level, the Massachusetts
case is a datum in favor of the Brown & Williamson rule.
But, of course, that view is far too simplistic. The substantive logic in
Massachusetts is, in the end, fundamentally incompatible with any substantive
justification for a “major questions” exception.5 Whereas the denial of deference
in Brown & Williamson seemed to rest on a view that administrative agencies
may not implement “major” policy changes,6 the denial of deference in Massachusetts ultimately obligated one such agency to implement—or at least seriously
to consider implementing—one such major change.7
The puzzle, therefore, is which case got it wrong. When an executive
agency has an opportunity to address a major political issue and to implement a
major policy reform, should it abstain, as Brown & Williamson suggests it should,
or should it act, as Massachusetts suggests it must?8
1

127 S.Ct. 1438 (April 2, 2007).
See Chevron U.S.A. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837 (1984) (creating a twostep inquiry for determining whether an agency’s interpretation of its governing statute is entitled
to deference). Under Chevron deference, the Court asks only two questions before accepting an
agency’s interpretation of its governing statute: whether the statute is silent or ambiguous on the
question at issue (Step One) and, if so, whether the agency’s interpretation of that statutory ambiguity is reasonable (Step Two).
3
See Cass R. Sunstein, Chevron Step Zero, 92 VA. L. REV. 187, 231–47 (2006) (identifying, explicating, and naming the “major questions” exception but concluding that it should not be enforced).
4
529 U.S. 120 (2000).
5
Jody Freeman & Adrian Vermeule, Massachusetts v. EPA: From Politics to Expertise (unpublished manuscript on file with author) (arguing that the problem with EPA’s decision not to regulate was, at least arguably, that the decision was based on crass political calculations rather than
expert scientific judgments).
6
See Sunstein, supra note 3.
7
See Freeman & Vermeule, supra note 5, at 18–19 (noting that Massachusetts and Brown & Williamson are incompatible in this sense).
8
The question is slightly more complicated than I make it out to be here. The “major questions”
exception comes into play only if Congress has not clearly bestowed authority in the agency. The
rule, in its simplest form, is one of many “clear statement” rules, holding not that agencies are

2
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Of course, there needn’t be—and, I will argue, shouldn’t be—a uniform
answer to that question for every administrative agency or for every major issue.
The appropriateness of executive intervention in a major policy battle might—
and, I will argue, should—depend on relevant legal and political circumstances.
That is, the Brown & Williamson rule needn’t and shouldn’t be a blanket exception for all executive treatments of major questions.
There is, however, no coherent story about the legal and political circumstances underlying Massachusetts and Brown & Williamson that would reconcile
the two holdings. There is no reason that executive intervention should have been
inappropriate in the context of Brown & Williamson but necessary in the context
of Massachusetts.
The initial puzzle, thus, remains: which case got it wrong? But the puzzle
has another layer, too. If Brown & Williamson got it wrong, then what were the
legal and political circumstances that made agency intervention appropriate, or
even necessary, in both cases? Or if Massachusetts got it wrong, then what were
the legal and political circumstances that made agency intervention unnecessary,
and even inappropriate, in both cases? Put another way: Which one of the cases
was right to deviate from Chevron?
As should be obvious from the title, this Article argues that Massachusetts
got it wrong—and that Brown & Williamson had it right.
The thrust of the argument, however, is not that the major questions exception, as it has been understood, is a good rule or that Massachusetts, as it has
been understood, is a bad case. The argument is instead that certain circumstances
operating in the background of Brown & Williamson—circumstances that the
Court and the academy have largely ignored—justified the Court’s substantive
intuition in that case that the agency’s action was inappropriate. Because the same
circumstances were operating in the background of Massachusetts, the Court
ought to have reached the same substantive conclusion there, too: that executive
action was inappropriate in the context of global warming.
The Article also argues that, whenever this particular background story is
repeated, (1) the executive ought to be restrained, (2) the judiciary is the right institution to restrain it, and (3) a Chevron exception is an appropriate tool for accomplishing that restraint. The argument, therefore, is that the “major questions”
exception should be reincarnated, yes, but also reconceptualized, with an emphasis on this background story rather than on the “majorness” of the relevant policy
question.
So what is the background story? What justifies the Chevron deviation in
Brown & Williamson?
In short, it is a story of simultaneous efforts in the executive and in Congress to effect changes in a single regulatory domain. In the background of both
Brown & Williamson and Massachusetts—and in the background of a predecessor
“major questions” case, MCI v. AT&T9—Congress was actively negotiating
absolutely forbidden to make major decisions but rather that agencies may make such decisions
only if Congress has clearly given them the authority to do so. This nuance, however, does not
impact any of the analysis that follows, and I therefore set it aside for simplicity’s sake.
9
MCI Telecommunications Corp. v. American Telephone & Telegraph Co., 512 U.S. 218 (1994).

3
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amendments to the relevant regulatory regimes at the same time that the agencies
considered and passed their regulations. And in the background of MCI and
Brown & Williamson, the agencies’ enactments perceptibly disrupted Congress’s
efforts.
The Court thus played a useful role in MCI and Brown & Williamson by
vacating the agencies’ enactments. It restored a regulatory status quo ante, allowing congressional negotiations to pick up where they had left off. In other words,
the agencies had shifted the targets around which Congress was negotiating, and
the Court simply shifted them back.10
The Court’s role in MCI and Brown & Williamson, thus, was nothing more
than that of referee, overseeing a complex game of political bargaining and preventing costly intermeddling between political institutions.
This refereeing role is not an unusual one for the Court. Indeed, the Brown
& Williamson rule, if understood as a doctrine of non-interference, was just one of
many doctrines that the Court uses to prevent intermeddling among governmental
institutions, such as preemption doctrines (preventing the states from interfering
with federal policy) and abstention doctrines (preventing the federal judiciary
from interfering with state judicial or federal executive proceedings).
This refereeing role is also a necessary one for the Court. Our constitutional design permits jurisdictional overlap, permitting both cooperative and competitive divisions of labor between the political branches. Although the resulting
inter-branch competition can create efficiencies, it can also give rise to wasteful
duplication and officious intermeddling. And when that harmful kind of competition occurs, the non-political branch—the judiciary—should step in to moderate
the game.
So Massachusetts got it wrong because, rather than preventing this kind of
meddlesome competition and costly target-shifting, the Court demanded it, encouraging EPA to implement status-quo-altering substantive regulations even
while Congress was negotiating overlapping reforms.
This Article proceeds as follows. Part I describes the birth of the “major
questions” exception in MCI and Brown & Williamson and the death of the exception in Massachusetts. Part II identifies the three forms of the “major questions”
rule that the Court and the literature have proposed to date and rejects all three,
concluding that the rule ought not to be reincarnated if it cannot also be reformed.
Part III proposes the non-interference form of the Chevron exception, demonstrating its foundations in the history of the “major questions” cases and demonstrating its similarities to other non-interference rules. Part IV offers Massachusetts as
a disanalogy to demonstrate the value and, indeed, the necessity of the noninterference rule. Part V proposes a doctrinal form for the reincarnated rule: a test
for future application of the non-interference doctrine. Part VI concludes.

10
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I. THE “MAJOR QUESTIONS” EXCEPTION: A COMPLETE LIFE STORY
Under the original Chevron doctrine, the Court asked only two questions
before deferring: whether the regulatory statute was silent or ambiguous on the
question at issue (Step One) and, if so, whether the agency’s interpretation of that
statutory ambiguity was reasonable (Step Two). But as Thomas Merrill, Cass
Sunstein, and others have noted, the Court has added a third, threshold step—a
“Step Zero”—to the Chevron framework, asking whether an agency’s decision is
of a kind that deserves any deference at all.11
In two of those Step Zero cases, the Court gave birth to a discrete Chevron
exception for agency interpretations that effect “major” changes, a rule that Sunstein termed the “major questions” exception to Chevron deference.12 In both of
those cases, MCI v. AT&T13 and FDA v. Brown & Williamson,14 the Court denied
deference to agencies’ reasonable interpretations of statutory ambiguity, seeming
to hold that the agencies deserved no deference because they had addressed issues
of major “economic and political significance.”15
But in Massachusetts v. EPA,16 the Court unceremoniously killed this
fledgling rule, issuing a decision that required an agency to address the—
concededly major—question of global warming.
This Part describes and analyzes each of the three opinions, highlighting
the substantive incompatibility between MCI and Brown & Williamson on the one
hand and Massachusetts on the other.
A. MCI: Whether “Major Modification” is a Contradiction in Terms
In 1994, the Court held that the Communications Act of 1934 (“Act”) did
not give the FCC authority to exempt designated “nondominant” carriers from the
Act’s tariff-filing requirement.17 Section 203 of the Act required communications
common carriers to file rates with the FCC and to charge only the filed rates,18 a
requirement originally intended to police AT&T’s natural monopoly in telephone
services.
Thanks to technological developments beginning in the 1950s, AT&T’s
monopoly began to dissolve as competition in long-distance services became feasible.19 New competitors then argued that rising market forces sufficed to disci11

The term “Step Zero” is the creation of Thomas Merrill and Kristin E. Hickman, Chevron’s
Domain, 89 GEO. L. J. 833, 836 (2001), later adopted and schematized by Sunstein, supra note 3
(identifying two “Step Zero” inquiries that the Court has adopted).
12
Sunstein, supra note 3, at 236.
13
512 U.S. 218 (1994).
14
529 U.S. 120 (2000).
15
Brown & Williamson, 529 U.S. at 160; see also id. at 133 (“In addition, we must be guided to a
degree by common sense as to the manner in which Congress is likely to delegate a policy decision of such economic and political magnitude to an administrative agency. Cf. MCI[.]”).
16
127 S.Ct. 1438 (April 2, 2007).
17
MCI, 512 U.S. at 231–32.
18
See Communications Act of 1934, 48 Stat. 1064, codified at 47 U.S.C. § 203 (1988 & Supp.
IV).
19
Id.
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pline their long-distance rates, rendering unnecessary the § 203 tariff-filing requirement. Agreeing that the requirement was more burdensome than beneficial,
the FCC enacted a series of rules exempting the new (“nondominant”) carriers
from § 203 strictures.20
As the only “dominant” carrier remaining under the new regulations,21
AT&T petitioned the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals for review of the FCC orders.
Among other things, AT&T argued that the FCC lacked authority under the Communications Act to eliminate the tariff-filing requirement for any carriers. The
D.C. Circuit agreed, and (eventually22) the Supreme Court affirmed.
The FCC had claimed regulatory authority under § 203(b)(2) of the Act,23
which permitted the agency to “modify any requirement made by or under the authority of” § 203. The debate in the Supreme Court was whether elimination of
the tariff-filing requirement for nondominant carriers constituted a mere “modification” of that requirement. The Court determined that it did not, reasoning that
detariffing was too “major”24 and “fundamental”25 of a change to constitute a
modification since “‘modify’ . . . has a connotation of increment or limitation.”26
To support the claim that permissive detariffing constituted a “radical or
fundamental change” to the Communications Act, the Court considered, first, “the
importance of the [tariff-filing requirement] to the [Communications Act as a]
whole” and, second, “the extent to which [a permissive detariffing policy] deviates from the filing requirement[.]”27 On the first point, the Court concluded that
the relevant requirement was “the heart of the common-carrier section of the
Communications Act” and that the elimination of that requirement for some carriers would be “tragic” for the regulatory regime.28 On the second point, the Court
determined that the permissive detariffing policy, which constituted “an elimination of the crucial provision of the statute for 40% of a major sector of the indus20

The FCC originally eliminated the tariff-filing requirement altogether for nondominant carriers.
When AT&T first challenged the mandatory detariffing rule, however, the FCC responded by
making the filing requirement permissive. The question before the Supreme Court, therefore, was
whether the FCC could make tariff filing optional for new competitors. See note 22, infra.
21
Although the FCC claimed to exempt only those carriers that had nondominant market power,
the distinction between dominant and nondominant carriers in the long-distance market “amounted
to a distinction between AT&T and everyone else.” MCI, 512 U.S. at 221.
22
The D.C. Circuit first vacated the detariffing policy in 1992. See American Telephone & Telegraph v. FCC, 978 F.2d 727 (1992). The Supreme Court denied certiorari to the D.C. Circuit. MCI
Telecommunications Corp. v. American Telephone & Telegraph Co., 509 U.S. 913 (1993). The
FCC responded to the D.C. Circuit’s opinion by instating a permissive (rather than mandatory)
detariffing policy. See MCI, 512 U.S. at 223; In re Tariff Filing Requirements for Interstate Common Carriers, 7 FCC Rcd 8072 (1992). The D.C. Circuit then granted summary reversal of the
permissive policy, restating that a detariffing order exceeded the FCC’s authority. See MCI, 512
U.S. at 223. To this second case, the Supreme Court granted certiorari and affirmed the D.C. Circuit in 1994, two years after the first D.C. Circuit decision and more than a decade after the first
FCC order. Id.
23
47 U.S.C. § 203(b)(2) (1988 & Supp. IV).
24
MCI, 512 U.S. at 227.
25
Id. at 228.
26
Id. at 225.
27
Id. at 229.
28
Id.
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try,” was “much too extensive [of a change] to be considered a ‘modification.’”29
The Court concluded that the FCC’s detariffing regulations were not entitled to
Chevron deference because the FCC’s interpretation of its modification authority
went “beyond the meaning that the statute [could] bear.”30
Majorness thus played a central role in the Court’s denial of deference.
The Court relied on the significance of detariffing to both the statute’s structure
and the industry’s operations in concluding that the FCC had exceeded its authority to “modify” § 203 requirements. But this focus on the enactment’s political
and legal significance was unusual for the Court, particularly among holdings that
are facially Step One holdings, denying deference based on a statute’s plain
meaning.
Of course, the case’s necessary focus on the word “modify” arguably
made the majorness distinction uniquely relevant in MCI; the case’s only question
was the degree of change that the word “modify” could bear. But the Court did
not merely decide that elimination of some requirement was too dramatic to constitute a “modification.” Instead, the opinion focused on the rate-filing requirement in particular, concluding that tariff filing was “the essential characteristic of
a rate-regulated industry” and that elimination of that single requirement was tantamount to total deregulation.31
At least one driving force behind the opinion, therefore, appears to be that
the rate-filing requirement was too important as a matter of policy to be eliminated, not that elimination qua elimination was too dramatic to constitute “modification.” MCI thus appears to rest in part on a Chevron Step Zero determination
that telecom deregulation is a “major” policy change that an agency should not be
permitted to effect.32
Importantly, the Court nowhere implied that the majorness of telecom deregulation was enough in itself to justify judicial, rather than administrative, resolution the debate. Rather, the implication of the Step Zero rule was that the agency
should be prevented from implementing any major policy change, including telecom deregulation, and the Court’s intrusion was necessary and appropriate only as
a means of accomplishing that restraint.

29

Id. at 231.
Id. at 229.
31
Id. at 231 (holding that Congress could not have left “the determination of whether an industry
will be entirely, or even substantially, rate-regulated to agency discretion”).
32
See Sunstein, supra note 3, at 236–42. Sunstein notes that MCI may be one of a “trilogy” of
Step Zero cases denying deferential review to major policy changes. The other two cases in the
trilogy, according to Sunstein, are Brown & Williamson and Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of
Communities for a Great Oregon, 515 U.S. 687 (1995). Sunstein includes Babbitt in the trilogy
primarily because the opinion cites the first scholarly article to have mentioned a “major questions” rule, an article that Justice Breyer wrote when sitting as a judge on the First Circuit. See
Stephen Breyer, Judicial Deference to Executive Agencies, 38 ADMIN. L. REV. 363, 370 (1986). As
Sunstein acknowledges, though, the Court’s treatment of the major questions idea in Babbitt is
limited and “cryptic.” For that reason, I will not include Babbitt in my analysis.
30

7
Hosted by The Berkeley Electronic Press

2/15/2008

DRAFT

Reincarnating the “Major Questions” Exception to Chevron Deference
B. Brown & Williamson: Whether Nicotine is a “Drug”
Six years later, the Court gave a much stronger indication that MCI had
created a Step Zero exception for major questions and that the purpose behind the
Step Zero rule was to prevent agencies from implementing major policy changes.
In FDA v. Brown & Williamson,33 the Court held that the Food and Drug
Administration (FDA) exceeded its authority when it determined that nicotine
qualified as a “drug” under the Food, Drug, and Cosmetics Act (FDCA).34 Section
321(g)(1)(C) of the FDCA defines “drugs” as “articles (other than food) intended
to affect the structure or any function of the body.”35
Relying on nicotine’s effects as a stimulant, tranquilizer, and appetite suppressor, the FDA determined that nicotine fell within § 321(g)(1)(C) and, therefore, that the agency had authority to regulate tobacco products.36 Having established its jurisdictional authority, the FDA also passed a series of regulations limiting the sale, distribution, and advertisement of cigarettes and smokeless tobacco.37
Tobacco manufacturers, retailers, and advertisers challenged the FDA’s
rulemaking, arguing among other things that the agency lacked jurisdiction to
regulate tobacco because nicotine is not properly a “drug” under § 321(g)(1)(C).38
By a 5-4 vote, the Supreme Court agreed with the tobacco industry, invalidating
the FDA regulations on the ground that the agency lacked jurisdictional authority.
The Court reasoned that the FDCA requires prohibition of “dangerous”
drugs and that tobacco, according to the FDA’s findings, could not be used safely.
Pursuant to that logic, the Court claimed that the FDA’s designation of nicotine as
a “drug” would require an all-out tobacco ban. The Court then concluded that
Congress could not have intended for the statutory definition of “drug” to encompass nicotine because Congress could not have intended to authorize the FDA’s
criminalization of the entire tobacco industry.
Just as it had in MCI, the Court couched its disposition as a Chevron Step
One holding; its primary conclusion was that the FDA’s broad interpretation of
the term “drug” was not entitled to deference because it “contravene[d] the clear
intent of Congress.”39 But in an unusual rhetorical move (especially for the justices in the majority, all of whom belonged to the Court’s conservative bloc), the
Court justified its Step One conclusion by reference to postenactment legislative
history.40 The Court reasoned that a series of tobacco-specific bills passed be33

529 U.S. 120 (2000).
21 U.S.C. § 301 et seq. (2000).
35
21 U.S.C. § 321(g)(1)(C) (2000).
36
See Brown & Williamson, 529 U.S. at 127. The FDA claimed jurisdiction over cigarettes and
tobacco as “combination devices,” 21 U.S.C. § 353(g)(1), designed to deliver nicotine to the body.
See Brown & Williamson, 529 U.S. at 127.
37
See id. at 126.
38
See id. at 129.
39
Id. at 132. Justice Scalia recently emphasized his belief that Brown & Williamson was a Step
One holding. See Gonzales v. Oregon, n.6 (2006) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
40
See See John F. Manning, The Nondelegation Doctrine as a Canon of Avoidance, 2000 SUP. CT.
REV. 223, 226 (2000) (noting that the opinion’s “heavy reliance on postenactment legislative his34
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tween 1965 and 1992 demonstrated Congress’s ratification of “the FDA’s longheld position that it lacks jurisdiction under the FDCA to regulate tobacco products”41 and demonstrated Congress’s intent to preserve for itself exclusive regulatory authority over tobacco.42
The Court’s reliance on postenactment legislative history seems puzzling
not only because the justices composing the majority ordinarily are disinclined to
rely on legislative history but also because the Court as a whole typically disfavors implied repeals.43 The Brown & Williamson opinion focuses for thirty-three
of its thirty-five pages on an implied-repeal argument, concluding that later statutes implicitly subtracted tobacco from the FDCA’s otherwise-broad definition of
“drug.”44 If the Court had relied exclusively on this disfavored reasoning, the
Brown & Williamson opinion would seem easily impeachable.45
The last two pages of the opinion, however, suggest a surprising crutch to
support an otherwise weak opinion. Relying exclusively on MCI, the Court wrote
that it was “confident that Congress could not have intended to delegate a decision of such economic and political significance to an agency[.]”46 More broadly,
the Court argued that “there may be reason” to deny deference in all “extraordinary cases”47 that involve “major questions.”48
The allusive Step Zero exclusion from MCI thus became explicit in the final salvo of Brown & Williamson. In a last-ditch effort to justify its denial of deference, the Court specifically referenced and adopted a “major questions” exception. And, as in MCI, the Court’s justification for the Step Zero rule was that
agencies should be forbidden to make such major changes.
C. Massachusetts: Whether Carbon Dioxide is an “Air Pollutant”
Seven years later, the “major questions” exception died.
In Massachusetts v. EPA,49 the Supreme Court held that the Environtory” was “puzzling” and seemed “out of character,” especially given that the justices composing
the majority were Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices O’Connor, Scalia, Thomas, and Kennedy).
41
Brown & Williamson, 529 U.S. at 144.
42
Id. at 149 (arguing that subsequent statutes demonstrated Congress’s intention to reserve for
itself “exclusive control” over tobacco regulation).
43
See Tennessee Valley Authority v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153 (1978).
44
See Manning, supra note 40, at 274–75.
45
See id. at 260 (“The ratification arguments ultimately represent an unconvincing account of legislative intent, one that the Court almost surely would have rejected in the absence of nondelegation concerns.”); id. at 274–75.
46
Brown & Williamson, 529 U.S. at 160 (emphasis added); see also id. at 133 (“In addition, we
must be guided to a degree by common sense as to the manner in which Congress is likely to delegate a policy decision of such economic and political magnitude to an administrative agency. Cf.
MCI[.]”) (emphasis added).
47
Id. at 159.
48
Id. (quotation marks omitted) (citing Breyer, supra note 32, at 370 (“A court may also ask
whether the legal question is an important one. Congress is more likely to have focused upon, and
answered, major questions, while leaving interstitial matters to answer themselves in the course of
the statute’s daily administration.”)).
49
127 S.Ct. 1438.
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mental Protection Agency (EPA) contravened the Clean Air Act (CAA) when it
refused to regulate vehicular emissions of greenhouse gases. The Court thus denied Chevron deference to an agency’s stance on the major question of whether
and how to respond to global warming, but it did so in a way that required, rather
than prohibited, agency intervention in the major policy debate.
The Chevron question in Massachusetts was whether EPA had statutory
authority to regulate greenhouse gas emissions from new cars.50 Under
§ 202(a)(1) of the CAA, EPA is required to standardize vehicular emissions of
any “air pollutant” that, in the Administrator’s judgment, endangers public health
or welfare.51 The CAA defines “air pollutant” as “any air pollution agent or combination of such agents, including any physical, chemical, biological, radioactive
(including source material, special nuclear material, and byproduct material) substance or matter which is emitted into or otherwise enters the ambient air.”52
Relying on these provisions, several private organizations filed a rulemaking petition with EPA, arguing that the agency should use its § 202(a)(1) power to
regulate four greenhouse gases: carbon dioxide, methane, nitrous oxide, and hydrofluorocarbons. The agency denied the petition, concluding that those substances do not fall within the statutory definition of “air pollutant” and, on that
basis, concluding that the agency lacked statutory authority to regulate greenhouse gases.53
In a 5-4 decision, the Supreme Court disagreed, refusing deference to
EPA’s interpretation of its statutory authority on the ground that greenhouse gases
unambiguously fall within the statutory definition of “air pollutant.” As in MCI
and Brown & Williamson, the majority opinion in Massachusetts represented itself as a Step One holding. The Court reasoned that greenhouse gases must necessarily be “air pollutants”—and that EPA must necessarily have authority to regulate them—because all four gases are, unambiguously, “physical or chemical substances that are emitted into the ambient air.”54
50

There were two other questions at issue in the case: whether the state of Massachusetts had
standing to challenge EPA’s decision and whether EPA’s refusal to exercise its statutory authority
was arbitrary and capricious. The Court’s holdings on those two questions are not particularly
relevant here, but the Court’s analysis in both sections is interesting for the current discussion. To
reach its conclusions on both points, the Court ended up emphasizing the majorness of global
warming as an economic and political issue. EPA had argued that Massachusetts lacked standing
in part because the state could not show that EPA’s decision caused any of the alleged injury: rising sea levels and loss of coastal lands. Its argument was that the refusal to regulate new car emissions was too small a decision to cause those harms. The Court responded: “[EPA’s] argument
rests on the erroneous assumption that a small incremental step, because it is incremental, can
never be attacked in a federal judicial forum. Yet accepting that premise would doom most challenges to regulatory action. Agencies, like legislatures, do not generally resolve massive problems
in one fell regulatory swoop. They instead whittle away at them over time, refining their preferred
approach as circumstances change and as they develop a more-nuanced understanding of how best
to proceed.” Massachusetts, 127 S.Ct. at 1457 (emphasis added) (citations omitted). The Court
thus characterized the agency’s decision as a first-step response to a massive regulatory problem.
51
42 U.S.C. § 7521(a)(1).
52
42 U.S.C. § 7602(g).
53
Massachusetts, 127 S.Ct. at 1459.
54
See 42 U.S.C. § 7602(g).
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In so holding, however, the majority opinion completely failed to address
EPA’s Step One argument. The agency never disputed that greenhouse gases are
physical or chemical substances, and it never disputed that those gases are emitted
into the ambient air. It argued only that greenhouse gases are not “air pollution
agents”55 because the effect that they cause—global warming—is not “air pollution.”
EPA’s textual argument was that greenhouse gas emissions do not, within
the ordinary meaning of the word, “pollute” the air because the gases occur naturally in the atmosphere. The agency also made a structural argument, asserting
that global warming must not constitute “air pollution” under the CAA because
the tools that the statute provides for responding to air pollution would be largely
ineffective in responding to global climate change.56
In his dissenting opinion, Justice Scalia argued that EPA’s position was at
least a reasonable interpretation of statutory silence, which should have received
deference under Chevron. That is, Justice Scalia argued that the CAA nowhere
defines “air pollution” and that EPA presented a reasonable interpretation of that
statutory silence in holding that global warming is not “air pollution.” And, of
course, Justice Scalia’s dissent assumed that a reasonable interpretation of statutory silence is all that Chevron demands.
Although Justice Scalia’s opinion presented a serious challenge to the majority’s Step One reasoning, the majority did not expand its Step One analysis in
response; instead, it stubbornly repeated its own incomplete argument.57 As a Step
One decision, therefore, the case is weak: weak on its own merits and weaker still
for its failure to confront and rebut Justice Scalia’s critique. There is no statutory
grounding for the holding that EPA needed to regulate greenhouse gases.
But, like the opinions in MCI and Brown & Williamson, the majority opinion in Massachusetts did not rest entirely on Step One analysis. The Massachusetts opinion also made a Step Zero argument, albeit an argument that is directly
opposed to the Step Zero analysis in Brown & Williamson.
After emphasizing the majorness of global warming as a modern economic and political issue58 (and thereby aligning Massachusetts with MCI and
Brown & Williamson in terms of the Step Zero predicate), the Massachusetts ma55

See id. (defining “air pollutant” as “any air pollution agent” that endangers public health or welfare, “including any physical [or] chemical . . . substance or material which is emitted into or otherwise enters the ambient air”).
56
EPA argued that National Ambient Air Quality Standards (NAAQS) require the measurement of
regional pollutants close to Earth but that greenhouse gases do not stay close to Earth or confined
to regions. As a result, EPA argued that it would be incapable of using the CAA’s statutory
scheme to respond to global warming, even if it asserted jurisdiction over greenhouse gases. The
agency thus argued that Congress must not have intended for the CAA to cover greenhouse gases
and global warming. If it had so intended, EPA argued, it would have provided some tool other
than the NAAQS. See Massachusetts, 127 S.Ct. at 1477 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
57
Id. at 1461 n.26 (“Justice SCALIA does not (and cannot) explain why Congress would define
‘air pollutant’ so carefully and so broadly, yet confer on EPA the authority to narrow that definition whenever expedient by asserting that a particular substance is not an ‘agent.’ At any rate, no
party to this dispute contests that greenhouse gases both ‘ente[r] the ambient air’ and tend to warm
the atmosphere. They are therefore unquestionably ‘agent[s]’ of air pollution.”).
58
Id. at 1446–49, 1457.
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jority argued that EPA should be required to confront this “‘most pressing environmental challenge of our time.’”59 The opinion seemed to hold that EPA bore
not only a statutory but also a social responsibility to confront the issue of global
warming, and the justices in the majority scolded the agency for abdicating that
social responsibility.60
The majority thus held that EPA must express an opinion on the major issue of global warming (or at least give carefully considered reasons for refusing
to do so).61
This holding is obviously contrary to the Step Zero holdings in MCI and
Brown & Williamson. The first two “major questions” cases denied deference on
the ground that the agencies must be restrained from making “major” decisions
whereas Massachusetts denied deference on the ground that the agency must be
forced to make a “major” decision.
D. Conclusion
In all three of the relevant cases, the Supreme Court highlighted the “economic and political significance” of the underlying regulatory questions, and in all
three cases, the Court refused deference to the agencies’ treatments of those major
questions. All three cases, thus, deviate from Chevron for reasons that seem to
relate to the majorness of the underlying issues.
That is, in all three cases, the justices rejected the agencies’ interpretations
in favor of their own, without making a compelling case of either statutory clarity
(Step One) or executive unreasonableness (Step Two), justifying their interventions instead by reference to economic and political majorness (Step Zero).
But despite the cases’ common departure from Chevron, they are incoherent when taken together. The Court’s substantive justification for denying deference in Massachusetts is the opposite of the Court’s substantive justification for
denying deference in MCI and Brown & Williamson.
The Brown & Williamson version of the “major questions” exception is,
therefore, currently dead. Under Massachusetts, there is no longer a presumption
against executive enactment of major policy changes, and there might, in fact, be
a presumption in favor of executive enactment of such changes.
II. A RULE IN SEARCH OF A RATIONALE
The question now is whether we should celebrate or mourn the death of
Brown & Williamson.
Among today’s scholars of administrative law and Chevron theory, there
might be a strong temptation to celebrate—or at least gladly to accept—the case’s
demise. In the years since Brown & Williamson was decided, most scholars have
59

Id. at 1446 (quoting Pet. for Cert. 22).
See Freeman & Vermeule, supra note 5 (arguing that the problem with EPA’s decision not to
regulate was, at least arguably, that the decision was based on crass political calculations rather
than expert scientific judgments).
61
Massachusetts, 127 S.Ct. at 1460–61.
60
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concluded that the Court’s opinion should be read narrowly or wholly rejected.
Indeed, the existing literature has almost unanimously concluded that the Brown
& Williamson rule lacks a coherent justification.
And I largely agree. There isn’t, in the abstract, any reason to prevent
agencies from making major decisions.
Of course, there’s more going on in Brown & Williamson than the majorness of tobacco regulation, as much of the literature has recognized. The scholarship has, therefore, imagined two alternative rationales for Chevron exceptionalism in Brown & Williamson, both of which center on deeper issues in the case:
agency aggrandizement and nondelegation. In other words, some scholars have
hypothesized that the Court’s underlying concern in Brown & Williamson was the
agency’s expansion of its own jurisdiction (aggrandizement) while other scholars
have hypothesized that the Court’s underlying concern was the statute’s excessive
delegation of lawmaking authority (nondelegation).
Despite having imagined and formulated these rationales, however, most
scholars are skeptical of them.
The trouble is that no conceptualization of the Brown & Williamson rule
that has been proffered thus far—bare majorness, nonaggrandizement, or nondelegation—ultimately provides a justification for Chevron exceptionalism; all
three of the underlying rationales are inconsistent with fundamental assumptions
of Chevron theory.
To support this conclusion, this Part begins with a brief description of
Chevron theory, outlining two competing rationales for Chevron itself and identifying the basic assumptions and arguments that are common to both. This Part
then elaborates the three proffered justifications for a major questions exception
and concludes, in agreement with the near-unanimous literature, that those rationales are doctrinally and normatively unsatisfactory; all three would be difficult
rules to enforce, and, more importantly, all three fly in the face of the two assumptions underlying Chevron.
I therefore conclude that, in the absence of a compelling reformulation of
the Brown & Williamson rule, we would be right to celebrate its death.
A. Chevron Theory
The competing camps of Chevron theorists can be divided by reference to
their acceptance or rejection of the delegation metaphor. On the delegation account, deference rests on the (admittedly fictive) congressional choice to delegate
law-interpreting power to administrative agencies, while on the competing account, deference is justified independently of congressional intent, resting instead
on broad separation-of-powers principles that counsel against judicial secondguessing of agency interpretations.
Although there is true disagreement among scholars as to whether the fiction of delegation is useful, the two competing theories ultimately rest on the
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same intuitions about institutional competence; the reasons for inferring delegation are identical to the reasons for restricting judicial intervention.62
1. Congressional intent.
Under the more common view of Chevron, deference is mandated by a
presumed congressional intent to delegate law interpreting authority to agencies.63
This “delegation” account holds that when congressional instructions are either
vague or absent, judges should assume that Congress delegated resolution of those
statutory ambiguities to the executive. In most such cases, of course, Congress did
not speak to the question of interpretive authority, either explicitly or implicitly,
so the delegation is purely fictional—a judicial presumption.64
Those who accept the delegation metaphor justify this presumption by reference to a kind of congressional meta-intention, arguing that a reasonable legislator in the modern administrative state would rather give law interpreting power to
agencies than to courts. The source of this meta-intention, then, is the perceived
institutional superiority of the executive relative to the judiciary.65 On this view,
courts presume that Congress has delegated interpretive power to agencies because expert agencies are presumptively better than generalist judges at construing statutory ambiguities.66
2. Separation of powers.
The alternative view of Chevron simply jettisons the fiction of delegation
and focuses squarely on the institutional competence justifications for judicial restraint.67 On this version of Chevron, courts defer to executive branch interpreta-

62

See Sunstein, supra note 97, at 17 (noting that the delegation fiction rests on “intensely pragmatic” considerations of institutional choice).
63
See Breyer, supra note 32, at 369; Antonin Scalia, Judicial Deference to Administrative Interpretations of Law, 1989 DUKE L.J. 511, 516–17. See also Robert A. Anthony, Which Agency Interpretations Should Bind Citizens and the Courts?, 7 YALE J. ON REG. 1, 4 (1990); John F. Manning, Constitutional Structure and Judicial Deference to Agency Interpretations of Agency Rules,
96 COLUM. L. REV. 612, 623–27 (1996); Merrill and Hickman, supra note 11, at 872–73.
64
Scalia, supra note 63, at 517.
65
See Breyer, supra note 32, at 365, 397 (noting that the pre-Chevron body of administrative law
represented a “skewed [ ] view of institutional competence” and justifying deference on the
grounds that it plays to courts’ and agencies’ relative expertise).
66
See generally Sunstein, supra note 3, at 198–205 (summarizing the key arguments in support of
the implied-intent reading, put forth by Justices Breyer and Scalia in the 1980s). As Sunstein describes, Justices Breyer and Scalia, though they disagreed as to the appropriate scope of mandatory
deference, agreed that the implied-intent reading of Chevron was best. But, as Sunstein points out,
both based their support of that reading on pragmatic considerations about relative institutional
competence.
67
See Jacob E. Gersen & Adrian Vermeule, Chevron as a Voting Rule, 116 YALE L.J. (forthcoming 2006); David M. Hasen, The Ambiguous Basis of Judicial Deference to Administrative Rules,
17 YALE J. ON REG. 327, 357–62 (2000); Douglas W. Kmiec, Judicial Deference to Executive
Agencies and the Decline of the Nondelegation Doctrine, 2 ADMIN. L.J. 269 (1988); Richard J.
Pierce, Jr., Reconciling Chevron and Stare Decisis, 85 GEO. L.J. 2225 (1997); Kenneth W. Starr,
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tions because they recognize that agencies are better than judges at making the
kinds of technical and political decisions that are involved in the daily administration of regulatory statutes.
Some theorists who advocate this reading of Chevron believe that judicial
restraint is constitutionally required under a forceful reading of the separation of
powers,68 while others advocate deference on purely pragmatic and consequentialist grounds, arguing that deference will lead to better policy results.69 For present
purposes, the constitutionality or non-constitutionality of this view is irrelevant;
the basic idea does not depend on its constitutional foundations. The “separation
of powers” account, thus, holds that judges should defer to agency interpretations
because they should recognize, independently of any spectral congressional instructions, that agencies will do a better job than courts of interpreting ambiguous
statutes.
3. Conclusion: Chevron’s two assumptions.
From this rough sketch of Chevron theory, we can extract two assumptions that are common to all justifications of deference. First, all Chevron theorists
make an “institutional choice assumption.” Chevron assumes that at the time of
the doctrine’s application, the institutional choice is limited to the court and the
agency. In other words, regardless of Chevron’s legal origins, a deference doctrine makes sense because, in the ordinary case, judges must choose between the
agency’s interpretation and their own.70
Second and subsequent, all theorists make an “institutional capacity assumption.” Chevron theory holds that as between the judiciary and the executive,
agencies are frequently (or usually, or always) better interpreters of regulatory
statutes than judges, thanks to their greater technocratic expertise and democratic
accountability. All theorists therefore assume that we should, at least by default,
prefer agencies to courts.
B. Chevron Theory and “Major Questions”: The Problems with Majorness,
Nonaggrandizement, and Nondelegation
Any workable justification for a “major questions” exception should operate within the boundaries of Chevron’s two universally accepted intuitions. The
rationale for any Chevron exception must not be that judges are ordinarily better
at interpreting regulatory statutes than agencies or that judges may allocate interpretive decision-making to a third body, such as Congress, rather than choosing
between the agency’s interpretation and their own. Such arguments would counsel

Judicial Review in the Post-Chevron Era, 3 YALE J. ON REG. 283, 309–10 (1986); Sunstein, supra
note 97, at 7–8.
68
See Hasen, supra note 67; Kmiec, supra note 67; Pierce, supra note 67.
69
See Gersen and Vermeule, supra note 67; Sunstein, supra note 97.
70
See Sunstein, supra note 3, at 232–33 (noting that “[b]y hypothesis,” Chevron is in play only
when “the only question is whether to accept an agency’s resolution or instead to rely on the interpretation chosen by a federal court”).
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in favor of rejecting Chevron wholesale; they cannot justify the mere creation of
retail exceptions.
Nevertheless, as we shall see, all three of the proffered rationales for the
“major questions” exception—majorness, nonaggrandizement, and nondelegation—fight one or both of these fundamental assumptions of Chevron theory.
1. Bare majorness.
The most straightforward explanation for the major questions exception,
of course, is the superficial view that agencies should be prevented from implementing major policies. Writing during his tenure as a First Circuit judge in 1986,
Justice Stephen Breyer advanced this understanding of Chevron on the ground
that Congress was unlikely to have delegated major questions to the executive.71
In his words, Justice Breyer’s argument was that Congress was “more likely to
have focused upon, and answered, major questions, while leaving interstitial matters to answer themselves in the course of the statute’s daily administration.”72
Since deference depends on a delegation and since Congress does not usually
delegate major questions to the executive, Justice Breyer argued, the Court should
not defer when an agency addresses a major question.73
But this bare majorness account raises both doctrinal and theoretical difficulties. As a blanket Step Zero exception, the bare majorness rule would be doctrinally problematic because it would be difficult to administer, and it would be
theoretically unjustified because it fights both of the fundamental assumptions
that underlie Chevron deference.
The first (more mundane) problem with the bare majorness view is an administrability problem. Consider MCI, the birthplace of the major questions exception: as Sunstein has pointed out,74 it is difficult to determine what the relevant
distinction is between that case and Chevron itself if we focus only on the majorness of the political issues. The tariff-filing requirement at issue in MCI was not
clearly of greater political or economic significance than the bubble policy at issue in Chevron.75 If anything, the bubble policy had greater economic significance than the tariff-filing requirement since the bubble policy affected all industrial manufactories while the tariff-filing requirement affected only long-distance
telephone carriers.

71

Breyer, supra note 32, at 370.
Id.
73
In later years, Justice Breyer has indicated that he intended “majorness” to be only one of many
factors that judges should consider when determining whether Congress had, in fact, delegated the
relevant question to the agency.
74
Sunstein, supra note 3, at 232.
75
The question in Chevron was whether the Environmental Protection Agency could interpret the
term “stationary source” as used in the Clean Air Act’s emissions restrictions to refer to an entire
factory rather than an individual smokestack. This simple reinterpretation had enormous practical
consequences.

72
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But even assuming that the policies at issue in MCI and Brown & Williamson were appreciably more major than the policy at issue in Chevron,76 we still
would need a mechanism for categorizing future “major questions” cases.77 The
Court never gave any indication, other than its somewhat vacuous reference to
“economic and political significance,” of how lower courts should determine
whether agency enactments are more like Brown & Williamson or Chevron.
Furthermore, the line between major and minor policies is easy to distort
by reframing the predicate question. If the question in MCI had been whether deregulation of the telecommunications industry was a major policy change, then
the Court’s “yes” answer would have been clearly defensible. But, as the MCI
dissent pointed out, a narrower framing of the question might have been more accurate: whether a permissive detariffing policy for designated nondominant interexchange long distance carriers constituted a major policy change. So framed, the
answer is much less clear.78
In the end, then, a bare majorness line does not provide an administrable
rule of decision for future cases because there is no principled difference between
a “major” question and a “minor” one. The Brown & Williamson rule, thus, might
not be worthy of mourning or reincarnation in this form; if its only purpose were
this prohibition of “major” executive enactments, the Brown & Williamson doctrine would seem excessively error-prone.
The second and more profound problem with the bare majorness understanding of the Brown & Williamson rule is that it offends Chevron’s assumptions
about institutional choice and institutional capacity.
Justice Breyer’s argument, remember, is that judges should review major
questions because reasonable legislators would not want to delegate those questions to agencies. But reasonable legislators surely would not want to delegate
those questions to judges, either.
Within Chevron’s hypothesis that we must choose between the executive’s
interpretation and the judiciary’s, it should be clear that agencies are betterequipped than judges to answer major political questions just as they are betterequipped to answer minor ones. In fact, the majorness of the policy makes the
technocratic expertise and democratic accountability of the decision-maker more
relevant, not less. Justice Breyer, however, offers no reason for believing that
judges are systematically better than agencies at answering “major” questions. He
merely ignores the institutional capacity assumption, making no effort to rebut it.
The only way to reconstruct a majorness exception to avoid this perverse
perception of institutional capacity is, instead, to fight Chevron’s institutional
76

See Sunstein, supra note 3, at 232 (arguing that the bare majorness line fails to distinguish the
“major questions” cases from Chevron because the policy at issue in Chevron also had major economic and political consequences).
77
See id.
78
The same can be said of Brown & Williamson. If the question had been whether criminalizing
the tobacco industry is a major policy change, then the Court clearly was right that it is. But if the
question was whether an incremental increase in advertising and sales restrictions on cigarettes
and smokeless tobacco constitutes a major policy change, then the Court’s decision seems much
more dubious.
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choice assumption. One might believe—and maybe Justice Breyer believed—that
Congress would be more likely to remain an active player in the institutional
game when major questions are at issue. Maybe Justice Breyer was comfortable
with a rule that requires judicial second-guessing of “major” administrative enactments because he believed that Congress retained working control over those
questions and would answer them itself if the agency were forbidden to do so. If
this assumption proved accurate in most “major questions” cases, then a majorness exception might well comport with Chevron’s institutional capacity assumption by allowing the legislature, rather than either the judiciary or the executive, to
make policy.
But the bare majorness rationale does not, in itself, justify skepticism towards Chevron’s institutional choice assumption. Even in cases of “major” significance, Congress might have checked out of the regulatory regime, leaving all
further rulemaking to the experts in the executive. A bare majorness exception,
therefore, would not necessarily leave policy making to legislators; it might, instead, allow judges to “make policy” by narrowing regulatory statutes and invalidating agency enactments even when Congress is extremely unlikely to correct
the judiciary’s mistakes.
In the end, then, a majorness exception violates Chevron’s theory of institutional capacity, empowering judges relative to agencies in the interpretation of
“major” questions. The only way to justify that outcome would be to make a
counter-Chevron assumption that Congress is a viable institutional option when
major questions are at issue.
The bare majorness rule, thus, lacks both practical and theoretical virtue.
As a judicial doctrine, the rule would be error-prone because the majorness line is
too difficult to administer. And as a Chevron exception, the rule lacks normative
justification; major questions, just like minor ones, trigger the theoretical underpinnings of the deference doctrine and should therefore trigger the doctrine itself.
So, in short, the Brown & Williamson rule should not be reincarnated in a
bare majorness form.
2. Agency aggrandizement.
The first of the two alternative justifications for Chevron exceptionalism
in the “major questions” cases is jurisdictional expansion or “agency aggrandizement.”79 The suggestion is that the intuition underlying the “major questions” exception is an intuition that courts should exercise greater scrutiny when an agency
expands its own jurisdictional reach. Self-aggrandizing interpretations, the argu79

See Timothy K. Armstrong, Chevron Deference and Agency Self-Interest, 13 CORNELL J. L. &
PUB. POL’Y 203, 261 (2004) (defining “major questions” as those that implicate “the issue of the
reach of [the agency’s] own regulatory authority”); Ernest Gellhorn and Paul Verkuil, Controlling
Chevron-Based Delegations, 20 CARDOZO L. REV. 989, 1015–16 (1999) (casting the distinction
between major and minor questions as a distinction between statutory constructions that involve a
“detail in a statute whose general application is undisputed” (minor questions) and statutory constructions that involve a “fundamental issue of the limits of administrative jurisdiction” (major
questions)); Merrill & Hickman, supra note 11, at 844–45 (defining major, or “extraordinary,”
questions as those in which “issues about the scope of the agency’s jurisdiction are concerned”).
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ment goes, might represent unscrupulous power-grabbing rather than responsible
lawmaking, and the judiciary should be wary of those interpretations.80
This nonaggrandizement justification for Chevron exceptionalism provides at least a plausible explanation for the disposition of Brown & Williamson.
The Court may have denied deference in that case because the FDA’s interpretation of the term “drug” would have given the agency new power over an enormous sector of the American economy.81 Perhaps, then, the background story that
justified the denial of deference in Brown & Williamson was a story of presidential power-grabbing.82
But this justification for a Step Zero exception, even if descriptively plausible, runs into the same normative-theoretical difficulties as the bare majorness
view. It, too, adopts a skewed perception of both institutional capacity and institutional choice.
In its best light, a nonaggrandizement rule rests on a view that agencies
engage in a kind of conflict of interest when they adjust their own mandates.83 As
it relates to Chevron theory, this argument is superficially convincing inasmuch as
it centers on a Chevron-style question of institutional capacity. Perhaps we want
an independent body, the judiciary, to protect against presidential power-grabs.84
But there is little reason to believe that executive agents will systematically abuse their right to adjust the scope of their jurisdiction. Indeed, there is no
coherent theory of bureaucratic incentives that would validate such skepticism.85
Instead, agencies’ decisions to aggrandize or to abrogate their power seem to be
core Chevron-style decisions, both technical and political in nature.
To use the two “major questions” cases as anecdotal examples: When the
FDA asserted jurisdiction over tobacco, it based its decision on painstaking analysis of nicotine’s addictive properties and on careful consideration of the jurisdictional assertion’s political consequences.86 Similarly, the FCC considered both the
technical and political significance of telecommunications deregulation before it
adjusted the Communications Act’s tariff-filing requirements.87 There was no reason, in either case, to believe that the agencies revised their jurisdictional reaches
because the bureaucrats had personal or institutional preferences for either greater
or lesser power.
80

See Sunstein, supra note 3, at 234–36.
See Armstrong, supra note 80, at 261 (describing Brown & Williamson as a nonaggrandizement
holding); Merrill & Hickman, supra note 11, at 844 (arguing that the majorness language in
Brown & Williamson is best understood as indicating jurisdictional concerns).
82
Of course, this explanation does not fit Massachusetts, in which the Court encouraged EPA to
expand its jurisdiction.
83
See Mississippi Power & Light Co. v. Mississippi, 487 U.S. 354, 387 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
84
See id.
85
See Daryl Levinson, Empire-Building Government in Constitutional Law, 18 HARV. L. REV.
915, 932–34 (2005). But see Armstrong, supra note 79.
86
See generally DAVID KESSLER, A QUESTION OF INTENT: A GREAT AMERICAN BATTLE WITH A
DEADLY INDUSTRY (2001).
87
See generally See Scott M. Schoenwald, Regulating Competition in the Interexchange Telecommunications Market: The Dominant/Nondominant Carrier Approach and the Evolution of
Forbearance, 49 FED. COMM. L.J. 367 (1997).
81
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Furthermore, even if executive agents held skewed preferences that would
lead them to push systematically for superoptimal or suboptimal power, there are
political checks on agencies’ decisions to expand or to contract their jurisdiction.88 It therefore seems unlikely that agencies would be able to adjust their mandates arbitrarily. At the very least, political forces will require agencies to develop
compelling technical and political reasons for their decisions, even if those reasons are not the bureaucrats’ primary or genuine motivations.
Based on this analysis, a jurisdictional exception to Chevron deference
seems to violate Chevron’s institutional capacity assumption. Because the decision to assert or to deny jurisdiction is one that requires both technical expertise
and political judgment, it is exactly the kind of decision that Chevron intended to
prevent judges from making.89
The advocates of a jurisdictional exception, however, do not limit their argument to an alarmist account of agency incentives. They also argue that there is
a relevant theoretical distinction between decisions of how to regulate, which are
non-jurisdictional decisions that should be left to agencies, and decisions of
whether to regulate, which are jurisdictional decisions that should be left to Congress.90 On this view, the reason for denying deference to jurisdictional decisions
is not that they are apolitical, such that judges can handle them, but rather that
they are super-political, such that Congress must handle them. On the institutional
hierarchy, these advocates argue, jurisdictional decisions must be left to the firstbest actor: the legislature.
Leaving aside the questionable assumption that jurisdictional decisions are
genuinely and perceptibly different in kind from non-jurisdictional decisions,91
this argument obviously falls into the same trap that the rehabilitation of majorness fell into; it assumes, without establishing, that Congress is still a viable institutional option. Under Chevron’s institutional choice hypothesis, congressional
resolution of jurisdictional questions—like congressional resolution of nonjurisdictional questions—is not an option. The only relevant consideration is
whether the executive or the judiciary is the better institutional decision-maker.
Within this framework, it seems clear that for both categories of questions—both
how and whether to regulate—judges are less capable and less attractive decisionmakers than executive agencies.
The nonaggrandizement rationale for the Brown & Williamson rule, therefore, is equally as unattractive as the bare majorness rationale. Jurisdictional decisions, even self-aggrandizing ones, should get deference. There would, therefore,
be little reason to mourn—and no reason to reincarnate—the Step Zero exception
in a nonaggrandizement form.

88

See Levinson, supra note 85, at 932–34.
For a similar argument, see Sunstein, supra note 3, at 235.
90
See generally Armstrong, supra note 79, at 245–46; Merrill & Hickman, supra note 11, at 909–
14.
91
See Mississippi Power & Light, 487 U.S. at 381 (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment) (arguing
that the distinction between jurisdictional and non-jurisdictional questions is fuzzy at best).
89
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3. Excessive delegations.
A second possible justification for the “major questions” rule is the muchdebated nondelegation principle92—which is described alternately as a constitutional doctrine,93 an interpretive canon,94 and a haunting distraction.95
Whatever status the nondelegation principle ought to hold in modern law,
it might, as a positive matter, explain the major questions cases. That is, the intuition driving Brown & Williamson may be that the FDCA, if understood to authorize the FDA’s regulations, would represent an unconstitutionally broad delegation
of policymaking authority. This understanding would explain the Court’s tortured
analysis in the case, which might just be the interpretive acrobatics necessary to
avoid striking down the statute on constitutional grounds.96
This idea overlaps somewhat with the nonaggrandizement rationale: one
problem with jurisdictional expansions is that they attempt to stretch statutory authority beyond the original delegation.97 But nondelegation is more ambitious
than nonaggrandizement. It encompasses agency enactments that neither
strengthen the agency’s enforcement power nor extend the agency’s jurisdictional
reach; nondelegation concerns arise whenever the agency claims broad interpretive or policymaking authority, which might be exercised either to narrow or to
expand a statutory program.
This nondelegation rationale for a major questions exception is, at first
blush, the least offensive to Chevron’s core assumptions. Ultimately, though, the
nondelegation account’s compliance with Chevron fundamentals exists only in
theoretical space; once applied, nondelegation falls into the same traps as majorness and nonaggrandizement.
On the strongest version of nondelegation, courts deny deference to
agency interpretations not because the judges are second-guessing the agency’s
decision but rather because they are invalidating Congress’s decision.98 The nondelegation doctrine is a constraint on the legislature, not the executive, which requires Congress to provide “intelligible principles” to define the scope of its delegations.99 Even when courts deny Chevron deference to promote nondelegation
92

Manning and Sunstein share this view, though both ultimately conclude that the nondelegation
understanding is normatively troubling. See Manning, supra note 40; Sunstein, supra note 3.
93
See A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935).
94
See Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 374 n.7 (1989) (indicating that the Court enforces
nondelegation by “giving narrow constructions to statutory delegations that might otherwise be
thought to be unconstitutional”); Cass R. Sunstein, Nondelegation Canons, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 315
(2000).
95
See Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Interring the Nondelegation Doctrine, 69 U. CHI. L.
REV. 1721, 1722 (2002) (claiming that the nondelegation doctrine is “undead”).
96
See Manning, supra note 40, at 260 (suggesting that the weak arguments in Brown & Williamson are understandable in light of background nondelegation concerns).
97
Cass R. Sunstein, Beyond Marbury: The Executive’s Power to Say What the Law Is, 115 YALE
L.J. 2580 (2006).
98
See Sunstein, supra note 94, at 329 (“[A] very strong version of the nondelegation doctrine
would suggest that agencies can . . . do nothing [if Congress has not spoken clearly as to the scope
of their authority] because the underlying grant of power is effectively void.”).
99
See J.W. Hampton & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 409 (1928).
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values, therefore, the invalidation of the agency’s enactment is merely a means to
the end of enforcing a constitutional limitation on Congress. This feature of nondelegation distinguishes it from both majorness and nonaggrandizement since
both of those rationales focus on agency misbehavior, attempting to keep bureaucrats within legislatively “intended” boundaries.
The relevance of the nondelegation view’s focus on legislation rather than
on agency enactments is that the rule does not, in the abstract, rely on the faulty
assumption of Congress’s continuing presence in the regulatory regime. That is, it
does not fight Chevron’s institutional choice assumption. When applying the nondelegation doctrine in its most ambitious and robust form, judges do not believe
that they are “returning” or “reserving” questions to Congress; they do not, in
other words, argue that the legislature failed to delegate and thereby retained
power over the relevant question. Instead, they emphatically believe that Congress
did intend to delegate authority but that the delegation itself was unconstitutional.
Judges enforcing nondelegation constraints, therefore, are not limiting agency
power in favor of congressional power; they are limiting congressional power itself, by purging American law of unconstitutional statutory breadth.
The problem with this view is that it is impossible to apply in practice,
whether attempted directly or through statutory interpretation. At the most basic
level, the problem with nondelegation is that the line between excessive and appropriate delegations is notoriously difficult to draw.100 Because no serious person
in the modern administrative state believes that Congress must answer every quotidian policy question that arises, there must necessarily be some threshold—some
magnitude of importance, or sensitivity, or “majorness” of policy questions—that
triggers nondelegation concerns.101 But no one actually knows where that threshold lies. As a result, courts will make frequent errors, narrowing statutes that are
constitutionally unproblematic and upholding interpretations that are constitutionally troublesome.
Of course, this line-drawing problem might not be a Chevron problem if
the project of distinguishing constitutional from unconstitutional delegations is a
legal project, falling within judges’ core competency. In other words, if evaluating
delegations were a legal project, then assigning nondelegation enforcement to the
judiciary would not violate Chevron’s institutional capacity assumption.
But the line-drawing project turns out to be far more political than legal.
As it turns out, the simple account of the line-drawing problem—the absence of a
threshold—is a bit too simple; the nondelegation principle lacks not only a clear
threshold but also, more significantly, a genuine theory. On closer inspection, the
“intelligible principles” requirement lacks substantive content; there simply are no
criteria for determining whether or not a statute provides “intelligible principles.”102 As a result, judgments regarding which delegations to enforce or what
limiting principles to impose will, inevitably, be arbitrary from a constitutional
100

See generally Richard B. Stewart, Beyond Delegation Doctrine, 36 AM. U. L. REV. 323, 324–
28 (1987).
101
See Stewart, supra note 100, at 325; Sunstein, supra note 94, at 326 (“[T]he line between a
permitted and a prohibited delegation is one of degree, and inevitably so.”).
102
See Stewart, supra note 100, at 324.
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point of view.103 In the end, those determinations will be based on value judgments and political preferences.104
This realist hypothesis is not radical; it is merely a restatement of Chevron’s institutional capacity assumption. One of Chevron’s most basic insights is
that choices as to how and when to implement regulatory statutes, at least when
the statutes are of ambiguous scope, are political rather than legal choices.105 And
those political choices should be left to the discretion of a democratically accountable institution. Of course, to the extent that any delegations are constitutionally problematic,106 agencies will make the same errors as judges; they, too,
lack any doctrinal means of deciding the extent to which they may constitutionally exercise a delegated authority. But their arbitrary decisions, at least, will
benefit from greater technocratic and democratic legitimacy.
If one accepts that these justiciability problems exist and accepts Chevron’s realist story, then the only remaining argument to support a nondelegation
restriction is to fight the central allegation of nondelegation skeptics: that judicial
constructions will stick. That is, nondelegation enthusiasts might respond to concerns about judicial policymaking by arguing that Congress can and should intervene to supersede judge-made outcomes that it finds politically troublesome. In
fact, some advocates of nondelegation make exactly this argument, expressing
their hope for lasting congressional involvement in terms of the need to enforce
legislative “responsibility” for relevant policy choices.107
In making this argument, of course, nondelegation enthusiasts wander into
the same trap that catches the majorness and nonaggrandizement enthusiasts; they
start to fight Chevron’s institutional choice assumption. Unless the nondelegation
advocates assume that Congress remains a viable institutional option, their proposed exception to Chevron merely elevates judicial policymaking over administrative policymaking, which is to strike at the very heart of Chevron theory.108
Like the bare majorness and nonaggrandizement accounts of the Brown &
Williamson rule, the nondelegation account lacks normative validity. Ultimately,
the enforcement of a nondelegation principle through Chevron exceptionalism
will disserve both Chevron and nondelegation.
103

Cf. Sunstein, supra note 94 (noting that certain categories of “clear statement” rules, such as
the canon against extraterritorial application, constitute clear and easily administered constitutional constraints that can be enforced against Congress through Chevron exceptionalism).
104
See Peter H. Schuck, Delegation and Democracy: Comments on David Schoenbrod, 20 CARDOZO L. REV. 775, 792–94 (1999).
105
See Sunstein, supra note 97 (rooting Chevron in a realist account of judicial decision-making);
Sunstein, supra note 94, at 329 (calling Chevron a “prodelegation” doctrine). For empirical evidence of the political nature of judicial decision-making in Chevron decisions, see Thomas Miles
& Cass R. Sunstein, Do Judges Make Regulatory Policy? An Empirical Investigation of Chevron,
73 U. CHI. L. REV. 823 (2006).
106
See Posner & Vermeule, supra note 95 (questioning the constitutional foundation of the nondelegation doctrine).
107
See, for example, David Schoenbrod, Delegation and Democracy: A Reply to My Critics, 20
CARDOZO L. REV. 731, 731–32 (1999). See also DAVID SCHOENBROD, POWER WITHOUT RESPONSIBILITY: HOW CONGRESS ABUSES THE PEOPLE THROUGH DELEGATION (1993).
108
See Sunstein, supra note 94, at 330.
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The Brown & Williamson rule, thus, cannot be justified by reference to a
nondelegation theory, meaning that the rule should be neither mourned nor reincarnated in that form.
4. A brief return to Chevron theory: a second theoretical divide.
Based on the preceding discussion, we can identify a second, and more
relevant, division among Chevron theorists: those who happily embrace and those
who begrudgingly tolerate Chevron’s institutional choice assumption. Those who
embrace the assumption, who hold a deep-seated skepticism towards Congress’s
interest and ability to engage in ordinary regulation, remain the strongest supporters of deference and the harshest critics of proposed limitations on Chevron’s
scope.109 On the other hand, those who worry about the institutional choice assumption, who harbor a quixotic conception of Congress’s interest and ability to
engage in daily regulation, are something like Chevron apologists; they gladly
support proposals to constrain Chevron’s application.110
This debate, though, turns on an empirical question that neither side bothers to answer empirically. And the right answer is likely to be somewhere in the
middle: Congress neither never nor always remains actively interested in monitoring established regulatory regimes.
C. Conclusion: A Rule Without a Rationale?
As it has been understood, the “major questions” rule lacks a workable rationale. When a “major” question or a jurisdictional question arises, we should
prefer the executive’s answer to the judiciary’s, and when a statute confers broad
authority, we should prefer to have the executive, rather than the judiciary, decide
the extent to which that authority should be exercised. Absent some other justification for Chevron exceptionalism, therefore, the deference doctrine should apply
in full force when an agency implements a major policy, aggrandizes its jurisdictional reach, or exercises a broad delegation.
The Brown & Williamson rule, thus, should be neither mourned nor reincarnated in any of the forms that the scholarship has proffered thus far.
III. A NEW RATIONALE: THE NON-INTERFERENCE VIEW
So why do I want to reincarnate this pesky rule? Because there is a workable rationale for Chevron exceptionalism in MCI, Brown & Williamson, and Massachusetts.
The best—and right—justification for the Brown & Williamson rule is a
practical idea orthogonal to majorness: when Congress has, in fact, remained actively interested in a regulatory regime, agencies should be forbidden from enacting regulations that would interfere with ongoing congressional bargaining.
109

See Gersen & Vermeule, supra note 67; Manning, supra note 40; Sunstein, supra note 3; Sunstein, supra note 97.
110
See Breyer, supra note 32; Merrill & Hickman, supra note 11.
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In the background of both MCI and Brown & Williamson, Congress was
actively considering changes to the relevant regulatory regimes. And in both
cases, the Court prevented the agencies from distorting the regulatory status quo
around which Congress was bargaining—or, more accurately, the Court restored a
regulatory status quo ante so that congressional negotiations could pick up where
they had left off.
The Brown & Williamson rule, then, was—and should be reincarnated
as—a doctrine of non-interference, designed to prevent institutional intermeddling
between the executive and legislative branches. In this sense, the exception is
similar to doctrines of preemption, which prevent state governments from interfering in federal regulatory domains, and it is similar to doctrines of abstention,
which prevent the courts from interfering in the political branches’ or the states’
regulatory domains.
This Part describes the foundations of the non-interference understanding
in the text of the MCI and Brown & Williamson opinions and in the background
stories of those cases, and then it elaborates the non-interference rule by reference
to analogous doctrines that similarly prevent institutional intermeddling and decisional simultaneity. In other words, this Part makes two relatively modest contributions to the Article’s thesis, demonstrating that the non-interference rationale is
a plausible description of the cases and that a non-interference rationale is an ordinary judicial concern. The argument that the non-interference rule is sufficiently
important to be reincarnated is reserved for Part IV.
A. Origins of Non-Interference
A non-interference understanding is not an obvious interpretation of MCI
and Brown & Williamson given that the Court’s central concern appeared to be
majorness. Institutional intermeddling is, admittedly, orthogonal to majorness.
Nevertheless, there is support for the non-interference understanding both in the
text of the opinions and in the history of the cases. This Part, first, describes the
Court’s references to institutional intermeddling and, second, tells the background
story of interference that operated behind each case.
1. Non-interference in the majority opinions.
In both MCI and Brown & Williamson, the majority opinions hinted that
prevention of institutional intermeddling partly motivated the Court’s dispositions.
In MCI, the Court noted that questions of detariffing and deregulation
should “‘address themselves to Congress, not the courts.’”111 But the decision to
reserve a question to Congress is an unusual one in a Chevron opinion; Chevron
analysis typically assumes that Congress empowers agencies to make policy deci-

111

Id. (quoting a case that predates Chevron by more than seven decades, Armour Packing Co. v.
United States, 209 U.S. 56, 82 (1908)).
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sions in order to avoid the cost of doing so itself.112 Significantly for the noninterference view, the explanation that the Court offered for this unusual argument
was that, ongoing at the time the opinion was written, there was “considerable
debate in other forums about the wisdom of the filed rate doctrine and, more
broadly, about the value of continued regulation of the telecommunications industry.”113 Although not explicit, the Court’s argument seems to have been that the
agency should allow Congress to address deregulation because the legislature had
already entered the debate.114 In other words, the Court seemingly held that active
congressional bargaining and deliberation should be allowed to continue, free of
FCC interference.
In Brown & Williamson, the non-interference logic was different; the
Court did not focus on ongoing debate, either in Congress or elsewhere. Instead,
the Court concluded that Congress, because it had already reached a bargain regarding tobacco regulation, had implicitly instructed the agency not to interfere.
The upshot of the Court’s puzzling analysis of postenactment legislative history
was that Congress had “adopted a regulatory approach to the problem of tobacco
and health that contemplated no role for the FDA.”115 To support this conclusion,
the Court quoted (among many other things) a Senate Report stating that “any further regulation in this sensitive and complex area must be reserved for specific
Congressional action,”116 and a circuit court case holding that FDCA expansion
“is the job of Congress,” not of the FDA.117 The Court thus held, quite unusually,
that Congress retained regulatory control over tobacco and that its retention of
control necessarily precluded concurrent administrative action. This conclusion
rests on a kind of dormant non-interference theory: that the agency should be forbidden to intrude in a regulatory domain if it appears that the subject matter belongs exclusively to Congress.
2. Non-interference in the background of each case.
The justices, however, did not directly discuss the most compelling evidence for the non-interference view of MCI and Brown & Williamson: the story of
congressional deliberations proceeding in the background of each case. In both
cases, members of Congress were debating the relevant regulatory regimes both
112

See Part IV (noting that one of Chevron’s fundamental assumptions is that Congress is no
longer actively involved in the regulatory regime).
113
512 U.S. at 234 (internal quotations and citations omitted).
114
Although the Court’s language about “considerable debate in other forums” does not refer directly to congressional debate, the legislature is the only alternative forum that should matter to
Chevron analysis. A Chevron enthusiast (such as Justice Scalia, the author of the MCI majority)
surely would be unimpressed by debate in, say, academic institutions or political think-tanks. Furthermore, as I will describe fully in the next section, Congress certainly fit the description of an
“other forum” that was debating deregulation at the time the Court decided MCI.
115
Brown & Williamson, 529 U.S. at 149 (emphasis added).
116
Id. at 151 (quoting S. Rep. No. 94-251, at 43 (1975) (additional views of Sens. Hartke, Hollings, Ford, Stevens, and Beall)).
117
Id. at 152–53 (quoting Action on Smoking and Health v. Harris, 655 F.2d 236, 243 (D.C. Cir.
1980)).
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before and during the agencies’ deliberations. Furthermore, in both cases, the
agencies’ decisions to intervene apparently affected congressional negotiations. In
the telecommunications case, agency intervention disrupted active congressional
debate; deliberation paused after the FCC completed its rulemaking, but negotiations quickly resumed and intensified after the Court vacated the agency’s enactments. In the tobacco case, agency intervention disrupted reasoned congressional
inertia; deliberation intensified dramatically after the FDA completed its rulemaking, but debate quickly died after the Court vacated the agency’s enactments. In
both instances, the agency’s interference altered the stakes in Congress’s game of
public choice, potentially wasting time and resources by forcing stakeholders and
legislators to adjust their negotiating positions to a new baseline.
(a) Telecommunications deregulation. Congress started considering new
legislation in the area of telecommunications regulation in 1976, when AT&T began lobbying to diminish the FCC’s power over the industry.118 The 1976 legislation, however, was not a serious proposal. Rather, it was a rent-seeking bill, derided as the “Bell bill,”119 which AT&T introduced in an attempt to curb the
FCC’s earliest procompetitive policies.120 Although the 1976 bill failed to emerge
from committee, it sparked congressional interest in telecommunications reform,
and that interest remained strong throughout the ensuing deregulatory process.
The first serious legislation proposing wholesale revision to telecommunications policy was introduced in late 1979,121 which was the same year that the
FCC started considering and writing its First Report on long-distance detariffing.122 Although neither the Communications Act of 1979123 nor a later version,
the Telecommunications Act of 1980,124 passed either chamber of Congress, debate on those two bills paved the way for a more modest amendment to communications law and FCC jurisdiction. The Record Carrier Competition Act of 1981
passed shortly thereafter.125
Continuing throughout the first half of the 1980s—as the FCC gradually
fine-tuned its detariffing policy126—Congress debated both the general wisdom of

118

See MARTHA DERTHICK & PAUL J. QUIRK, THE POLITICS OF DEREGULATION 183–87 (1985).
Id.
120
Id. at 179.
121
Another non-serious bill was introduced in 1978, id.; H.R. 13015, 95th Cong. (1978), which
sparked lengthy hearings, Communications Act of 1978: Hearings on H.R. 13015 Before the Subcomm. on Communications of the House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 95th Cong.
(1978), but did not make it to a vote in either chamber. DERTHICK & QUIRK, supra note 118, at
187.
122
See Competitive Carrier Notice of Inquiry, 77 F.C.C.2d 308 (1979); Competitive Carrier First
Report, 85 F.C.C.2d 1, 52 Rad. Reg. 2d (P&F) 215 (1980).
123
H.R. 3333, 96th Cong. (1979).
124
H.R. 6121, 96th Cong. (1980).
125
95 Stat. 1687 (repealed 1994).
126
The FCC issued six reports implementing its detariffing policy, finalizing and releasing the last
report in January of 1985. See Scott M. Schoenwald, Regulating Competition in the Interexchange
Telecommunications Market: The Dominant/Nondominant Carrier Approach and the Evolution of
Forbearance, 49 FED. COMM. L.J. 367, 390–402 (1997); Competitive Carrier Sixth Report, 99
F.C.C.2d 1020, 57 Rad. Reg. 2d (P&F) 1391 (1985).
119
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telecommunications deregulation127 and the specific benefits of proposed statutory
overhauls.128 Also during that time, Congress held many oversight hearings, specifically considering the FCC’s approach to competition policy and proposing
changes to the FCC’s regulations.129
Once the FCC finalized its detariffing policy, however, congressional consideration of telecommunications deregulation paused. Between 1985 (the year
the FCC issued its final order) and 1993, Congress did not consider any serious
legislation,130 though it continued to hold hearings on deregulation and FCC oversight.
But in 1993, the year after the D.C. Circuit issued its final opinion vacating the FCC’s rules131 and the same year that the Supreme Court granted certiorari,132 serious debate began again.133 That second round of deliberation, then,
culminated in Congress’s passage of the Telecommunications Act of 1996,134
which, among other things, embraced the FCC’s detariffing policy.135
127

See Status of Competition and Deregulation in the Telecommunications Industry: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Telecommunications, Consumer Protection, and Finance of the H. Comm.
on Energy and Commerce, 97th Cong. (1981); AT&T Proposed Settlement: Hearing Before the S.
Comm. on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, 97th Cong. (1982) (considering AT&T divestiture pursuant to a Department of Justice consent decree); Economic Issues of a Changing Telecommunications Industry: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Agriculture and Transportation of the
J. Comm. on Economic, 98th Cong. (1983)
128
See Telecommunications Competition and Deregulation Act of 1981, S. 898, 97th Cong.
(1981); Telecommunications Act of 1982, H.R. 5158 (1982); Federal Telecommunications Policy
Act of 1986, S. 2565, 99th Cong. (1986).
129
See Monopolization and Competition in the Telecommunications Industry: Hearing Before the
S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 97th Cong. (1981) (considering a provision of the Telecommunications Competition and Deregulation Act of 1981 that would have legislatively designated AT&T
as a “dominant carrier” under FCC regulations); FCC Authorization Legislation: Oversight: Hearing on H.R. 2755 Before the Subcomm. on Telecommunications, Consumer Protection, and Finance of the H. Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 98th Cong. (1983); Universal Telephone Service Preservation Act of 1983, S. 1660, 98th Cong. (1983) (proposing to amend the FCC regulations in order to ensure continued universal access to basic telephone services); Impact of Recent
FCC Decisions on Telephone Services: Hearing on H.R. 4102 Before the Subcomm. on Telecommunications, Consumer Protection and Finance of the H. Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 98th
Cong. (1983); Federal Communications Commission Oversight: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on
Telecommunications, Consumer Protection and Finance of the H. Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 98th Cong. (1984); Reauthorization and Oversight of the FCC: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Communications of the S. Comm. on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, 99th
Cong. (1985).
130
The Federal Telecommunications Policy Act of 1986, S. 2565, 99th Cong. (1986), was the last
bill introduced until the Telecommunications Policy Act of 1990, 101st Cong. (1990). Neither bill
was serious enough to emerge from the initial committee process.
131
See American Telephone & Telegraph Co. v. F.C.C., 978 F.2d 727 (1992).
132
MCI Telecommunications Corp. v. AT&T Co., 510 U.S. 989 (1993).
133
The Telecommunications Policy Act of 1990 was not a significant proposal. Serious bargaining
began again with the introduction of the Telecommunications Infrastructure Act of 1993, S. 1086,
103rd Cong. (1993). See JAMES SHAW, TELECOMMUNICATIONS DEREGULATION 27 (1998) (claiming that “Congress seriously debated a restructuring of the Communications Act of 1934 beginning in 1993”).
134
47 U.S.C. § 151 et seq. (2000).
135
See Schoenwald, supra note 126, at 449–52.
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Admittedly, this chronology is a small part of a much bigger picture. The
1985 pause in congressional deliberation is, undoubtedly, also attributable to the
passage of the final consent decree that broke up the Bells, which occurred at
about the same time. And Congress certainly had a lot more than long distance
regulation in mind when it debated and passed the Telecommunications Act of
1996, which encompasses much more than long distance rates. The point here,
however, is only that congressional consideration of long distance regulation—in
both floor activity and committee activity—tracks FCC action on the same regulatory issues. Even though long distance regulation was a small part of a big story,
Congress was actively interested in long distance regulation throughout the time
that the FCC acted, and Congress’s ability and motivation to legislate apparently
faltered after the FCC finalized its rules.
In sum, the story of telecommunications deregulation is a story of simultaneous negotiations in Congress and the executive. The FCC’s success at reforming long distance regulation before Congress passed any significant legislation
seemingly caused congressional deliberations to stop for a period of time. Congress then restarted its negotiations in earnest as soon as the judiciary struck down
the agency’s enactments, and the legislature was able to pass significant reforms
just three years after resuming deliberation.
(b) Tobacco regulation. Congress’s consideration and passage of tobacco
regulations has a long history, as the Supreme Court acknowledged in Brown &
Williamson.136 In the three decades preceding the FDA’s announcement in 1994
that it would consider asserting jurisdiction over tobacco, Congress had enacted
six pieces of tobacco-specific legislation.137 The precise question of FDA jurisdiction over tobacco has an equally long congressional history, having been considered periodically since 1964.138
But the most interesting feature of the institutional story behind Brown &
Williamson is the rash of congressional activity that began just after the FDA
launched its official rulemaking process. As noted, Congress had averaged one
tobacco bill every five years in the three decades preceding the FDA’s announcement. In the short time between the beginning of FDA deliberations and the ruling
of the Supreme Court, Congress averaged one tobacco bill per year, passing five
tobacco-specific provisions in five years. By the time the Supreme Court vacated
the agency’s rulemaking, Congress had enacted limited versions of most of the
FDA’s major initiatives, including programs to reduce teen smoking, prohibitions

136

529 U.S. at 137–39.
See Brown & Williamson, 529 U.S. at 137–38 (listing six pieces of tobacco-related legislation
that Congress passed between 1965 and 1992).
138
See Cigarette Labeling and Advertising: Hearings Before the H. Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 88th Cong. (1964); Public Health Cigarette Amendments of 1971: Hearings Before Consumer Subcomm. of the S. Comm. on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, 92d Cong.
(1972); Cigarettes: Advertising, Testing, and Liability: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Transportation, Tourism, and Hazardous Materials of the H. Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 100th
Cong. (1988); Health Consequences of Smoking: Nicotine Addiction: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Health and the Environment of the H. Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 100th Cong.
(1988).
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on vending machine sales, and higher excise taxes on all tobacco products and
cigarette papers.139
The most significant congressional debate, however, did not occur during
the agency’s deliberative process; it began after the agency published its jurisdictional statement and regulations. The agency finalized its rulemaking in August of
1996, at the close of the 104th Congress. In the next Congress, just one year after
the FDA published its enactments140 and six months after the trial court upheld
those regulations,141 Senator John McCain introduced the first of an eventual six
comprehensive tobacco bills that would be considered in the 105th Congress.142
These comprehensive bills were legislative versions of the “global tobacco settlement,” which had been proposed in litigation to end forty-one state attorney
generals’ lawsuits against the tobacco industry.143 And the 105th Congress did not
limit itself to comprehensive legislation; members also introduced more than fifty
other bills that would have made incremental changes to tobacco regulation.144
On June 17, 1998, the comprehensive reform proposal died in a filibuster,
and serious congressional debate came to an abrupt halt. Interestingly, though perhaps coincidentally, the filibuster occurred exactly one week and one day after
oral arguments in the Fourth Circuit145; by that time, it had become fairly clear
that the Court of Appeals would declare the FDA’s regulations unlawful.146 After
the Supreme Court affirmed the Fourth Circuit’s decision, a few members of
Congress once again attempted to give the FDA jurisdiction,147 but debate never
139

The FDA launched its official investigation with a letter to the Coalition on Smoking or Health,
which it sent on March 25, 1994. KESSLER, supra note 86, at 87–88. Immediately following the
agency’s announcement, Congress passed a bill that increased funding for public school programs
designed to curb youth smoking, a key target of the FDA’s proposed regulations. See Improving
America’s Schools Act of 1994, Pub. L. 103–382, 108 Stat. 3518 (1994). Just one year later, Congress banned the sale of cigarettes in vending machines in or around federal buildings, a limited
version of another FDA proposal. See Prohibition of Cigarette Sales to Minors in Federal Buildings and Lands Act, Pub. L. 104–52 § 636, 109 Stat. 468 (1995). In the next three years, Congress
also increased excise taxes on tobacco and cigarette papers, Balanced Budget Act of 1997, Pub. L.
105–33, 111 Stat. 251 (1997), passed a second law funding school programs that target youth
smoking, Omnibus Consolidated and Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act, Pub. L. 105–
277, 112 Stat. 2681 (1999), and passed two laws facilitating document requests in the mass tort
suits pending against the tobacco industry, Tobacco Production and Marketing Disclosure, Pub. L.
106–47, 113 Stat. 228 (1999); Agriculture, Rural Development, Food and Drug Administration,
and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, Pub. L. 106–78, 113 Stat. 228 (1999).
140
The FDA published its jurisdictional statement and regulations on August 28, 1996.
141
See Coyne Beahm, Inc. v. U.S. Food & Drug Admin., 966 F.Supp. 1374 (April 25, 1997).
142
See Universal Tobacco Settlement Act, S. 1415, 105th Cong. (1997) (introduced Nov. 7, 1997).
See generally C. Stephen Redhead & Joy Austin-Lane, Tobacco Litigation in the 105th Congress:
Side-by-Side Comparison of S. 1415, S. 1530, S. 1638, S. 1889, H.R. 3474, and H.R. 3868, CRS
Report to Congress (Aug. 19, 1998).
143
Redhead & Austin-Lane, supra note 142, at 1.
144
See id. at 7–12.
145
See Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. Food & Drug Admin., 153 F.3d 155 (1998) (argued
June 9, 1998).
146
See KESSLER, supra note 142, at 363–66 (describing the oral arguments).
147
See Adam Clymer, Legislators Planning Response to Justices’ Ruling on F.D.A., N.Y. TIMES,
March 24, 2000, at A19.
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again reached the level of seriousness that it reached in the two years following
the FDA’s rulemaking.
Like the story of telecommunications deregulation, the story of tobacco
regulation is one of simultaneous activity in Congress and the executive. During
the FDA’s deliberations, Congress confronted many of the agency’s core concerns and enacted limited versions of the agency’s basic proposals. But the FDA’s
successful assertion of jurisdiction sparked a congressional panic, which ended
only after the Fourth Circuit vacated the agency’s enactments. The interference
story, then, is one of executive intermeddling with Congress’s devotion to incrementalism.148
(c) Conclusion. In both MCI and Brown & Williamson, Congress was,
demonstrably, an active player in the relevant regulatory regimes. Although the
interference stories are markedly different in the two cases, they both involve simultaneous deliberation throughout the early parts of the agencies’ investigations,
and they both involve manifest changes in Congress’s bargaining after the agencies finalized their rulemaking processes. And in both cases, Congress returned to
its deliberative status quo ante after the courts intervened. A non-interference intuition, then, would explain the Court’s holdings in both cases.
Furthermore, we can imagine discrete harms that might have flowed from
the agencies’ interference in both cases and can therefore imagine concrete benefits that would result from the Court’s fix.
Taking the telecom case, imagine a pro-regulatory member of Congress
who has developed a good relationship with AT&T on this issue and is therefore
willing to oppose deregulatory overhauls by, for example, introducing amendments when deregulatory statutes reach the floor. Once the FCC passed its deregulatory rules, that same member of Congress would need to figure out whether
she would be willing to stick to her substantive position by supporting bills and
amendments that would reverse the FCC regulations. Importantly, the answer
might go either way, depending on political realities that are difficult to assess.
We could easily imagine that overturning an FCC rulemaking would be politically
riskier than proposing amendments to limit or even to kill deregulatory overhauls,
148

The non-interference conclusion here is a bit rough in the following sense: The Court could not
possibly restore the substantive status quo ante without altering the jurisdictional status quo ante.
That is, in order to invalidate the FDA’s regulations, the Court had to hold that the FDA lacked
jurisdiction under the FDCA to regulate tobacco. The Court thus created certainty, where no certainty had existed before, as to the meaning of the FDCA and as to the authority of the FDA. The
Court did not and could not restore the status quo ante in a pure form. This complication could
significantly undermine the Article’s thesis if it turned out that Congress was more concerned with
FDA jurisdiction than with substantive tobacco regulation, in which case the Court was the final
arbiter in the tobacco debate. That is, by this account, the Court did not simply erase a meddlesome change and return regulatory control to Congress; it took control of the central issue and
resolved it. This account, however, does not seem entirely persuasive given the history of tobacco
regulation. All of Congress’s enactments prior to the FDA’s intervention were substantive, not
jurisdictional. Although Congress debated FDA jurisdiction on a number of occasions—and debated it rigorously after the FDA asserted jurisdiction—the congressional commitment that the
FDA interfered with was a substantive one, not a jurisdictional one. The relevant congressional
commitment was the commitment to incrementalism, and the relevant congressional enactments
were direct, substantive regulations.
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but we could just as easily imagine that undoing the work of an adversary in the
White House would be politically rewarding. The Congresswoman would therefore need to invest in polling data or other new information to determine what impact, if any, the FCC’s action should have on her voting preferences, and she
would lose at least some of the value of her prior investments in similar information. As an additional cost to the process, AT&T would also need to invest in new
information to figure out how valuable a reversal of the FCC ruling would be and
how much it would cost to convince members of Congress to pass such a reversal.
This point might be even easier to see in the tobacco case. Imagine that the
voters in a congressional district are generally opposed to the lobbying influence
of tobacco companies but are also generally opposed to FDA regulation. The
Congressman who represents that district might have invested in relationships
with anti-tobacco advocates during the many years that Congress was devoted to
an incremental approach, but once the FDA acted, he might have needed to support legislation that would strip the FDA’s jurisdiction, thereby harming the relationships he had developed over the prior decades.
The agencies’ interference, thus, might have imposed real informational
and reputational costs on members of Congress who had already invested in the
regulatory domain. By altering the status quo—by changing the substantive regulatory reality against which stakeholders and voters had formed their preferences—the agencies diminished the value of those prior investments and forced
the legislators’ and lobbyists’ to make new investments in their new reality.
The question now remaining is whether this story of institutional intermeddling justifies a Chevron Step Zero exception—whether such an exception
would be beneficial from legal and theoretical perspectives.
B. Analogous Doctrines
From a legal perspective, the concept of non-interference is neither new
nor unusual. In fact, the non-interference rationale for the Brown & Williamson
rule is an instantiation of a concern that arises regularly in both federalism and
separation of powers jurisprudence—namely, the prevention of intermeddling and
simultaneity among institutions exercising overlapping authority. This same goal
of non-interference motivates, for example, preemption and abstention doctrines.
The first example of an analogous rule is the doctrine of “obstacle” preemption, which invalidates any state law that “stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress.”149
Unlike other versions of preemption, obstacle preemption requires neither explicit
nor implicit federal instructions against state interference. Rather, the doctrine vacates any state action that intermeddles with the accomplishment of federal goals.
Obstacle preemption, then, rests not on the supremacy of federal laws but rather
on a general supremacy of congressional policy.150 As a result, the instruction that
the Court gives to states under obstacle preemption is the same as the instruction
149

Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941).
See generally Caleb Nelson, Preemption, 86 VA. L. REV. 225 (2000) (arguing that obstacle
preemption has no grounding in the Supremacy Clause).
150
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that it gave to the agencies in MCI and Brown & Williamson: “Step aside. Your
action is interfering with congressional policymaking.”
The second analogy is to federalism-inspired abstention doctrines, most
famously Pullman abstention,151 which limit federal courts’ interference with state
policymaking and with state court proceedings. Collectively, these doctrines rest
on the same two policy concerns that motivate Step Zero non-interference: prevention of officious intermeddling and avoidance of wasteful duplication.
Very roughly, federal courts will abstain from exercising their jurisdiction
in two scenarios152: (1) when they are asked to consider undecided questions of
state law153 and (2) when they are asked to interfere directly (as by injunction)
with ongoing state court proceedings.154 Abstention is justified in the first scenario by respect for the states’ primacy in interpreting their own laws and in the
second by respect for the state courts’ concurrent and coequal jurisdiction over
certain cases. The logic, then, is that federal courts should not intermeddle with a
state’s superior ability and equal right to decide questions of state law.
A converse abstention doctrine allows federal courts to enjoin state court
proceedings (effectively forcing the state court to abstain) when state jurisdiction
is likely to result in harmful duplication of pending federal proceedings.155 This
exception to the anti-injunction rule avoids the waste of trying the same case in
two forums, particularly when state court proceedings seem likely to interfere
with the federal court’s exercise of jurisdiction.
The two justifications, then, that are common to this body of abstention
doctrines are the same as the justifications that motivate Step Zero noninterference. In fact, we can state the intuition undergirding the Brown & Williamson rule in abstention terms: the Step Zero cases hold that administrative agencies—despite their concurrent authority to make certain policy decisions—should
abstain from rulemaking whenever the exercise of their authority would interfere
with or harmfully duplicate a standing or pending congressional bargain.

151

See Railroad Commission v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496 (1941) (holding that federal courts
should decline to exercise jurisdiction if (1) the case raises state-law questions that should be decided by state courts and (2) the decision of the state-law question might allow federal courts to
avoid deciding a constitutional question).
152
See generally ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION §§ 12.1–13.4 (4th ed. 2003).
153
See, e.g., Louisiana Power and Light Co. v. City of Thibodaux, 360 U.S. 25 (1959) (applying
Pullman abstention even in the absence of a significant constitutional question on the grounds that
the state’s interest in deciding the state-law question was unusually strong); Burford v. Sun Oil
Co., 319 U.S. 315 (1943) (holding that federal courts should abstain from reviewing state administrative agencies’ orders because such federal review would cause “[d]elay, misunderstanding of
local law, and needless federal conflict with the State policy”).
154
See Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971) (holding that federal courts should not enjoin state
court proceedings because there is a “longstanding public policy against federal court interference
with state court proceedings”).
155
Atlantic Coast Line R.R. v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers, 398 U.S. 281 (1970) (interpreting the anti-injunction statute as allowing federal courts to enjoin state court proceedings when
necessary “to prevent a state court from so interfering with a federal court’s consideration or disposition of a case as to seriously impair the federal court’s flexibility and authority to decide that
case”).
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The final analogy is to the two abstention-like doctrines that operate in
administrative law, both of which prevent federal courts from interfering with executive policymaking: exhaustion and primary jurisdiction. These two doctrines
rest on the same non-interference rationale as the federalism-inspired abstention
doctrines and as Step Zero non-interference.
Exhaustion, which requires federal courts to stay proceedings until the litigants have exhausted all remedial processes available in administrative agencies,156 “serves to avoid piecemeal interruption of administrative processes, to
eliminate unnecessary judicial effort, and to secure the views of agency experts on
questions within their competence.”157 In other words, the doctrine prevents federal courts from intermeddling with administrative decision-making and prevents
litigation from proceeding simultaneously in judicial and administrative forums.
The second administrative-law abstention doctrine, primary jurisdiction, is
a similar rule with a different starting point; it prevents courts from entertaining
suits that should be decided in administrative proceedings, even when administrative processes have not yet begun. The logic underlying primary jurisdiction is
that courts should correctly “allocate initial decision making responsibility between agencies and courts where . . . [jurisdictional] overlaps exist.”158 Again, the
motivation is the same as in the Step Zero non-interference cases: to avoid friction
and overlap between two institutions that both have authority to act.
In sum, non-interference is a quotidian concern in both federalism and
separation of powers jurisprudence. Although existing non-interference doctrines
constrain state legislatures and state and federal courts rather than constraining
federal agencies, the extension of the logic to the Step Zero context is not radical.
The interaction between agencies and Congress is not different in kind from the
interaction between state legislatures and Congress, between courts and agencies,
or between federal courts and state courts. All non-interference doctrines concern
the appropriate division of labor among governmental institutions, and it is coherent in all contexts of overlapping jurisdiction to limit one institution in favor of
another in order to avoid needless friction and duplication. The non-interference
understanding of Brown & Williamson, therefore, is at least ordinary.
IV. VIRTUES OF A NON-INTERFERENCE RULE
Of course, the ordinariness of a non-interference rule would not be enough
to argue in favor of reincarnating Brown & Williamson—and, by necessary extension, killing Massachusetts. But the non-interference rule is not merely ordinary.
It serves important goals in the management of a multi-branch government.
This Part proceeds as follows. First, it briefly revisits Chevron theory to
demonstrate that the non-interference understanding justifies Chevron exceptionalism—that is, that Step Zero non-interference complies with both of the core
Chevron hypotheses. Second, it presents Massachusetts as a disanalogy, explain156

See generally RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR., SIDNEY A. SHAPIRO, AND PAUL R. VERKUIL, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND PROCESS § 5.7.2 (3d ed. 1999).
157
DAVID P. CURRIE, FEDERAL JURISDICTION IN A NUTSHELL 179–80 (4th ed. 1999).
158
PIERCE ET AL., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND PROCESS § 5.8.
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ing the potential harms of the holding in that case and, by extension, explaining
the usefulness of the non-interference principle.
A. Chevron Theory and Non-Interference
The virtue of the non-interference understanding from a theoretical perspective is that it justifies an exception to deference without fighting either of the
core Chevron hypotheses. It fully preserves the institutional capacity assumption
of judicial inferiority, and it avoids making any counter-Chevron institutional
choice assumptions about Congress’s future involvement.
The most important feature of the non-interference rule from a theoretical
perspective is that it is triggered only by case-specific evidence that Congress is
interested in the precise question before the court. This feature has two payoffs.
First, the non-interference view does not require judges to evaluate agencies’ policy decisions. The trigger is an agency’s perceptible interference with a
specific congressional bargain, not any particular characteristic (such as majorness or aggrandizingness) of the agency’s policy. The non-interference rule, thus,
does not assume that courts will be appropriate or capable evaluators of agencies’
political decisions; that is, it does not violate the institutional capacity assumption.
Instead, the judges’ role is the humble role of referee, telling agencies to step
aside while Congress plays.
Second, the necessity of congressional involvement eliminates the possibility that judicial policy will stick. This is not to say that the legislature will inevitably alter the reality created by judicial decision; Congress might, as in the
tobacco case, fail to pass the legislation it was considering, in which case the judicially-created status quo will remain. But the concern underlying tales of judicial
stickiness (and the concern motivating Chevron’s institutional choice assumption)
is not simply that judge-made policy will last; it is that judge-made policy will
remain unchecked, due to the sheer ignorance and inertia of the political branches.
The virtue of the non-interference view, then, is that Congress’s active interest in
the precise question eliminates (or at least significantly mitigates) the concern that
judge-made outcomes will go undetected and unconsidered.
In sum, the non-interference understanding of the major questions exception is superior to the proffered alternatives because it does not fight either the
institutional choice assumption or the institutional capacity assumption underlying
Chevron theory. It is an exception to Chevron rather than a challenge to Chevron
because it relies on specific facts in the world that judges are capable of perceiving and that give rise to a discrete need for judicial intervention.
B. Massachusetts and Non-Interference
It is, however, still not enough to say that a non-interference rule is consistent with Chevron. Unless the rule is independently useful, there would be no reason to enforce a Chevron exception at all—no reason to reincarnate Brown & Williamson. But the Step Zero non-interference rule is useful.
The easiest way to demonstrate this point is to present Massachusetts as a
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disanalogy, to point out the potential harms that could flow from the Court’s failure to enforce a non-interference rule in that case. By this account, Massachusetts
is error; it does not fit the non-interference principle and therefore cannot be justified.
The first step in the argument is to tell the story of non-interference that
operated in the background of Massachusetts and to demonstrate that the Court
could have enforced a non-interference rule in that case. The second step is to acknowledge a worthy instinct that might have underlain the Court’s decision in
Massachusetts: an instinct to promote, or even to require, executive expression of
expert opinions.159 The final step is to explain why the non-interference instinct
should have trumped the “expertise-forcing”160 instinct in Massachusetts and why
the non-interference rule should trump the expertise-forcing rule in future cases.
1. Non-interference in the background of Massachusetts.
The non-interference story in Massachusetts has much in common with
the one in Brown & Williamson. Congress’s history of global warming regulation
is almost as long—and almost as tortured—as its history of tobacco regulation.
And in both cases, the post-enactment legislative histories indicate that Congress
may have preferred—and may have been actively working towards—a separate
regulatory structure for the precise issues that the agencies confronted.
Congress became actively interested in global warming as an independent
issue in the late 1970s, enacting its first global-warming-specific statute in 1978161
and a second such statute in 1987.162 Of course, neither of those bills implemented
a regulatory scheme. The 1978 National Climate Program Act merely ordered the
President to create a coordinated executive program to gather data on climate
change and to ponder the diplomatic implications of global warming, and the
1987 Global Climate Protection Act simply ordered EPA to draft a report to Congress on the science and politics of global warming.
In 1990, the issue of climate change burst onto the international stage with
the first report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change,163 and the
treaty model became a realistic supplement to domestic regulation as a means of
addressing climate change. In 1992, President Bush signed and the Senate ratified
the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC),
which was (like the domestic bills that had passed) simply a non-binding declaration that global warming is probably a real problem.
After the ratification of that treaty, congressional interest in global warming faltered. Although the 101st and 102nd Congresses had proposed a combined

159

See Freeman & Vermeule, supra note 5.
The term “expertise-forcing” is Freeman and Vermeule’s. See Freeman & Vermeule, supra
note 5.
161
Massachusetts, 127 S.Ct. at 1448 (citing National Climate Program Act, 92 Stat. 601 (1978)).
162
Global Climate Protection Act, Pub. L. 100-204, 101 Stat. 1407 (1987) (cited in Massachusetts,
127 S.Ct. at 1448).
163
Massachusetts, 127 S.Ct. at 1448.
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total of 56 bills related to greenhouse gas emissions, the 103rd and 104th Congresses proposed a combined total of only one such bill.164
Then in 1997, the signatories to the UNFCCC wrote the Kyoto Protocol,
which was the first attempt at a binding regulatory structure for reducing greenhouse gas emissions and curbing or reversing anthropogenic global warming. Although the Senate unanimously refused to ratify the Kyoto Protocol, Congress’s
interest in global warming picked up in the wake of the Kyoto debate.165 In the
105th Congress, members introduced 22 bills related to greenhouse gas emissions.166
In the middle of the 105th Congress and then again at the beginning of the
106th Congress, EPA took the position at congressional hearings that it had authority under the CAA to regulate greenhouse gases,167 but the agency did not
then act on that authority.
The rulemaking petition that became the center of Massachusetts was presented to EPA in 1999, and at the same time, the legislature’s interest in global
warming grew perceptibly stronger. After considering only 22 bills in the 105th
Congress and an average of only about 15 per Congress in the prior four, the legislature averaged over 50 proposals per Congress from 1999 to 2006, climbing to
64 proposals in the 109th Congress alone.168 The legislature also held oversight
hearings throughout this time, specifically to discuss EPA’s authority.169
Interestingly, EPA’s denial of the rulemaking petition in 2003 did not coincide with any significant change in congressional action; the 107th Congress
introduced 51 proposals, and the 108th introduced 57.
Then, the Supreme Court issued its opinion, demanding action from EPA,
and at the same moment, Congress went into a fury.170 So far in the 110th Con164

See Natural Gas Vehicle Incentives Act of 1996, H.R. 4288, 104th Cong., 2d Sess. These numbers come from a search of Thomas, the Library of Congress’s internet search engine. See
http://thomas.loc.gov. I searched bills in each Congress from the 101st to the 110th, which are the
ones that are searchable through Thomas. Using “greenhouse gas emissions” as the search term
brings up 32, 24, 0, and 1 in the 101st, 102nd, 103rd, and 104th Congresses respectively. Using
“global warming” produces slightly different results but a similar trend, showing 139, 60, 18, and
2 in the same Congresses. Using “climate change” shows 160, 99, 18, and 34 in the same Congresses. The drop-off is therefore clear regardless of which search terms one uses; the 103rd Congress did very little work on the issue compared to its predecessors.
165
See id. at 1448–1449 (citing S. Treaty Doc. No. 102–38, Art. 2, p. 5 (1992) (UNFCCC), and S.
Res. 98, 105th Cong., 1st Sess. (July 25, 1997) (as passed) (Senate Resolution expressing the Senate’s sense that the U.S. should not enter the Kyoto Protocol).
166
Id. Fourteen of those proposals reached the floor, and one reached the President’s desk.
167
Massachusetts, 127 S.Ct. at 1449.
168
The numbers for the 106th, 107th, 108th, and 109th Congresses are 44, 51, 57, and 64 bills
respectively, for an average of 54 proposals per session. Ninety-eight of those bills reached the
floor, and nine of them reached the President’s desk.
169
Is CO2 a Pollutant and Does EPA Have the Power to Regulate It?: Hearing Before H. Comm.
On Government Reform, 106th Cong., 1st Sess. (Oct. 6, 1999). See, e.g., Clean Air Act: Risks from
Greenhouse Gases: Hearing Before S. Comm. on Environment and Public Works, 107th Cong., 2d
Sess. (March 13, 2002); Clean Air Act Oversight Issues: Hearing Before S. Comm. on Environment and Public Works, 107th Cong., 1st Sess. (2001).
170
A causal claim is harder to make here than in the tobacco case. The 110th Congress was also
the first Congress since 1994 to be controlled by the Democratic Party, which may be a more com-

37
Hosted by The Berkeley Electronic Press

2/15/2008

DRAFT

Reincarnating the “Major Questions” Exception to Chevron Deference
gress, members have introduced 139 bills that include some provision related to
greenhouse gas emissions.171 Several of those bills would implement the very
regulations that the petitioners asked EPA to implement,172 while others would
implement President Bush’s preferred market-based and voluntary approaches.173
The story of global warming regulation, thus, meets the predicates of Step
Zero non-interference. Congress was actively aware of and negotiating in the
regulatory domain prior to EPA’s involvement and throughout the time that EPA
deliberated. That is, negotiations occurred simultaneously in both institutions.
Furthermore, the beginning of public deliberation at EPA coincided with increased deliberation in Congress, and the Court’s incitement of serious deliberation at EPA has coincided with a dramatic increase of deliberation in Congress.
2. Massachusetts and expertise-forcing.
Although there are many commonalities between the Massachusetts and
Brown & Williamson background stories, there is also one important difference.
Whereas Congress seemed to view FDA as a competitor in the project of tobacco
regulation, it seems to view EPA as a partner in the project of global warming
regulation.
Many of the congressional proposals and enactments related to global
warming specifically invited executive participation in the debate, ordering scientists in the executive to conduct the research and to provide the information that
would be necessary to confront the challenge of global warming. Indeed, in its
discussion of post-enactment legislative history, the Massachusetts majority
pointed out that all of Congress’s global-warming-specific enactments were simply efforts “to promote interagency collaboration and research to better understand climate change”174; Congress had not, the Court noted, enacted any “binding emissions limitations to combat global warming[.]”175 This point provided
contrast with the tobacco-specific bills that comprised the post-enactment history
in Brown & Williamson, all of which were direct regulatory efforts and none of
which requested FDA participation in identifying the harms of tobacco or the
benefits of proposed regulations.
pelling explanation for the significantly increased activity. There was no such regime-change in
the tobacco case.
171
Remember, this number compares to an average of about 30 proposals per Congress in the preceding nine Congresses and a maximum of 64 proposals in any given Congress from 1989 to
2006. Also, the number of proposals in the 110th Congress increases to 182 if one uses “climate
change” rather than “greenhouse gas emissions” as the search criterion. Of the 139 bills that include references to “greenhouse gas emissions,” 51 have reached the floor of at least one chamber,
and two have reached the President’s desk.
172
See, e.g., Clean Fuels and Vehicles Act of 2007, S. 1073, 110th Cong., 1st Sess.; Safe Climate
Act of 2007, H.R. 1590, 110th Cong., 1st Sess.; National Low-Carbon Fuel Standard Act of 2007,
S. 1324, 110th Cong., 1st Sess.
173
See, e.g., Climate Stewardship Act of 2007, H.R. 620, 110th Cong., 1st Sess.; Greenhouse Gas
Accountability Act of 2007, H.R. 2651, 110th Cong., 1st Sess.; National Greenhouse Gas Registry
Act of 2007, S. 1387, 110th Cong., 1st Sess.
174
See Massachusetts, 127 S.Ct. at 1448, 1460–61 & n.28.
175
Id. at 1460.
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The Court thus reasoned that, because Congress’s efforts in the realm of
global warming were information-gathering efforts rather than direct regulatory
efforts, those bills could not be viewed the same way that the tobacco bills were
viewed: “as tantamount to a congressional command to refrain from regulating[.]”176
This difference might matter a great deal for present purposes if it proves
that executive action would have counted as helpful participation in—rather than
officious intermeddling with—Congress’s project. In holding that EPA had authority to regulate, maybe the Court was simply urging EPA to fulfill this congressionally-assigned informational role.
Indeed, there has been at least one serious suggestion that this “expertiseforcing” account of Massachusetts is the best way to read the case. Jody Freeman
and Adrian Vermeule argue that Massachusetts is best read as an attempt to reprimand the excessive politicization of EPA decision-making and to require
expression of a scientific—rather than political—opinion on the issue of global
warming.177
This view could be synergistic with the non-interference rationale. Like
the non-interference view, the expertise-forcing view has much to say about the
effect that executive regulation can and should have on a larger regulatory enterprise.178 That is, executive regulations have the potential to be meddlesome, as the
non-interference view assumes, but they also have the potential to be informative,
as the expertise-forcing view reveals. By acting first, an agency might, as in the
tobacco case, disrupt congressional activity, but it might additionally or alternatively convey useful information to Congress about the nature and the effectiveness of executive scientists’ preferred approach. Indeed, taking Chevron’s institutional capacity theory, the executive’s regulations should reflect both scientific
expertise and political sensitivity, meaning that executive decisions should blend
the considerations that are most relevant to responsible democratic rulemaking.
Perhaps, then, generalist legislators will create better outcomes, from a perspective of democratic representation, if they legislate against a richer backdrop of
executive enactments.
Pursuant to this view, the Court’s role at Step Zero could be to measure
Congress’s preference for either executive participation or executive abstention
and to require the agency to play the role that Congress prefers. When Congress
has repeatedly invited executive participation, as in the global warming case, the
Court should require executive regulation, and when Congress has repeatedly discouraged or precluded agency participation, as in the tobacco and telecom cases,
the Court should prohibit executive regulation.
By this account, both Massachusetts and Brown & Williamson got it right.

176

Id.
Freeman & Vermeule, supra note 5.
178
This point is not the primary focus of Freeman and Vermeule’s article, however. They view the
de-politicization of EPA decision-making as a good in itself, without reference to EPA’s ability to
inform an ongoing congressional project.
177
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3. Non-interference and expertise-forcing.
The problem with the expertise-forcing account is that executive regulations are not merely informative. When an agency promulgates regulations, it is
not just pontificating; it is affecting the real world, changing the status quo. And a
midstream change in the status quo, unlike a mere informational update, will significantly raise the cost of legislating, as mentioned in Part III, above, in the stories of diminished investment and necessary reinvestment. Lobbyists and legislators will be forced to reevaluate their positions in light of a new regulatory reality—to discard old investments and to create new ones.
All of this is to say the following: the bottom line justification for the noninterference view is that Congress’s deliberative process is, by nature, a long and
cumbersome one, which, to function as cheaply as possible, requires a fixed target, not a moving target, around which legislators can negotiate.
Some might object to this argument on the ground that congressional action always trumps administrative action. A non-interference rule might therefore
be unnecessary since Congress can always undo administrative “interference” and
therefore need not take serious account of midstream regulatory changes. It can
instead treat midstream changes as though they were mere executive pontifications.
But such midstream regulatory changes, unlike, say, informative memoranda or policy statements, have real impacts on the interests of legislators and
stakeholders. Remember the hypotheticals presented above: a pro-regulatory Congresswoman who needs to decide whether to support a statutory reversal of the
already-implemented FCC regulations and an anti-tobacco, but also anti-FDA,
Congressman who will necessarily ruin standing relationships with anti-tobacco
advocates in order to undo the already-implemented FDA regulations. These are
plausible scenarios—and we could imagine many more—that indicate the increased costs associated with a change in the status quo, and the costs that these
scenarios indicate would not be incurred if the agencies had merely presented new
information to the legislators. Regulatory change, thus, is costly even though
Congress can undo it through new legislation, and it is far more costly than simple
updates in scientific and political information.
There is also a pure legal argument to support the view that Congress’s
trumping power should be irrelevant to Step Zero non-interference: that view is
fully consistent with the usual operation of non-interference doctrines. The point
of a non-interference rule is not to prevent the first actor from setting the rule; it is
to prevent simultaneous actors from disrupting each other’s processes. In many of
the situations that give rise to analogous non-interference rules,179 the institution
that was supposedly “interfered with” clearly had the power to trump the “interfering” institution through later enactments or decisions. Obstacle preemption, for
example, restrains state legislatures even though a later-enacted national statute
would trump any conflicting state statutes, and Pullman abstention prevents federal courts from deciding questions of state law even though later-acting state
179
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courts could trump federal interpretations. Furthermore, in both of those cases, the
restrained institution could have provided information to its coequal by acting
first. That is, by legislating in a field of “obstacle preemption,” the states could
provide information to Congress about their individual preferences, and by addressing a question of state law, the federal courts could provide their insight (arguably an expert insight) on a tricky legal question.
In the context of Step Zero non-interference, the point of the noninterference principle is not merely to prevent agencies from beating Congress in
a race to regulate. The point is to prevent agencies from moving the target around
which Congress is bargaining. The non-interference rule simply recognizes that
lawmaking becomes more costly if a regulatory regime changes, independently of
congressional action, in the middle of the congressional bargaining process. The
nightmare story is not that the agency’s decision will prevent Congress from acting; it is that the agency’s decision will fundamentally alter legislators’ and stakeholders’ incentives, requiring the public choice game to start afresh.
None of this is to say that administrative regulations are not informative.
Even less is it to say that information is unimportant. But here is the critical point:
agencies can present information to Congress without issuing status-quo-altering
rules and regulations. There is therefore no need to incur the costs of such regulations in order to gain the benefit of information.
Let’s now consider the case of global warming: The allegations of excessive politicization of EPA decision-making are troubling, particularly since they
include allegations that the White House has been actively silencing executive
scientists.180 Because scientific information is a necessary component of responsible rulemaking in scientific domains, we should be bothered by allegations that
political agents are altering and stifling technocratic information about global
warming.
It does not follow, however, that the only remedy—or a right remedy—is
to require the scientists to implement binding regulations. As the Court unwittingly pointed out in the Massachusetts opinion, Congress is perfectly capable of
demanding information, through obligatory research and reports, from executive
scientists.181 Furthermore, Congress has tools, such as hearings and concomitant
subpoena powers, to oversee the executive’s research and reporting procedures.182
We need not fear, therefore, that enforcement of a non-interference rule will prevent Congress from gathering information about the executive branch’s views and
preferences, and we should not defy the non-interference principle in order to enforce informational transfers. Return for a second to the telecom and tobacco
cases: Congress could have ordered a report from the FCC addressing the continuing necessity of tariff-filing as a means of rate regulation (and the FCC could have
provided such a report without a congressional mandate), and Congress could
have ordered a report from the FDA addressing addictive properties of nicotine
180
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and the need for greater tobacco regulation (and the FDA could have provided
such a report without a congressional mandate). It was not necessary in either case
for the agencies to implement binding regulations in order to convey their scientific and political judgments to the legislature.
The Massachusetts majority was undoubtedly right to conclude that “collaboration and research do not conflict with any thoughtful regulatory effort; they
complement it.”183 But it was absolutely wrong to conflate “collaboration and research” with implementation of binding regulations. The executive’s regulatory
effort, once enacted, will always be costly to an ongoing, parallel regulatory effort
in Congress.
The non-interference rationale, therefore, should always trump the expertise-forcing rationale when the question is whether the executive should enact
new regulations in a domain that Congress is actively negotiating.
V. A DOCTRINE OF NON-INTERFERENCE
Perhaps the greatest challenge for a reincarnated non-interference rule
would be to develop a standard for distinguishing serious congressional deliberation from strategic congressional posturing. If members of Congress knew that
merely debating an issue would preclude executive authority, then they would
have a perverse incentive to engage in meaningless debate whenever they wanted
to prevent executive action in a particular regulatory regime. The purpose of the
non-interference rule is not to give Congress a tool for blocking executive policymaking; it is to prevent the executive from interfering with ongoing and serious
congressional policymaking. In developing a test for future enforcement, then, the
key is to identify the hallmarks of sincere deliberation and true interference. Four
factors are apparent in the three “major questions” cases.
(1) Pre-Interference Activity. In the tobacco, telecom, and global warming
cases, Congress had been active in the relevant debates before the executive
started its decision-making process. In the telecom case, Congress entertained revisions to the FCC’s organic statute three years before the FCC started its detariffing process. In the tobacco case, Congress had passed several tobacco-specific
bills before the FDA considered asserting jurisdiction, and it had held hearings in
the few years immediately preceding the agency’s actions, specifically considering the possibility of granting the agency jurisdiction under the FDCA. In the
global warming case, Congress had passed at least five global-warming-specific
statutes before the petitioners presented their rulemaking petition to EPA, and it
had debated dozens more. The occurrence of debate and the passage of legislation
before the agency intervened constitute strong evidence that Congress’s interest in
the regulatory regimes existed independently of any desire to block executive
policymaking.
(2) Post-Announcement Activity. In both the tobacco and the telecom case
studies, Congress’s committee and floor activities perceptibly increased immediately after the agencies began considering regulation. That is, immediately after
183
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the agencies started their investigations, members of Congress started holding
more hearings and introducing more legislation than they had before the agencies’
announcements. Such an immediate increase in activity might be evidence that
Congress prefers to legislate before the agency has a chance to finish its rulemaking process. In the global warming case, congressional activity increased just before the agency received its rulemaking petition, but it spiked just after the Court
issued its decision requiring EPA action.
(3) Post-Enactment Activity. In both the tobacco and telecom cases, there
was a perceptible change in Congress’s activity immediately following the
agency’s final rulemaking. In the tobacco case, Congress dramatically increased
its deliberations, while in the telecom case, it dramatically decreased its deliberations. A shift in either direction indicates that the agency’s action disrupted a preexisting process. Of course, it is too early to tell whether and how EPA regulations, once implemented, will affect congressional deliberations.
(4) Aggressive Oversight. During the debates over telecom deregulation,
tobacco regulation, and greenhouse gas regulation, Congress aggressively monitored not only the agencies’ specific decision-making processes but also the agencies’ general activities. In the tobacco and telecom cases, however, oversight
slackened significantly once the agencies completed their rulemaking processes.
This trend might be evidence of an attempt to influence or to stall the agencies’
rulemakings.
Taken together, these four factors probably suffice to identify cases in
which an agency’s actions truly disrupt a congressional bargaining process. The
test requires some evidence of congressional activity before the agency intervened, and it requires close temporal connections between steps in the agency’s
decision-making process and changes in Congress’s bargaining process. Furthermore, the test incorporates magnitude requirements; increases or decreases in
congressional activity must be fairly dramatic to trigger suspicions of interference. These factors should be enough to prevent strategic posturing since the introduction of a bill imposes at least some opportunity cost on the member who
introduces it and on the institution as a whole; that same member and then the institution must forego work on different—and potentially more important—issues
in order to introduce, for example, a tobacco bill.
Of course, a doctrine of non-interference would not be error-proof. Judges
might find connections between executive and legislative activity that are purely
coincidental, and they might fail to perceive genuine congressional reactions to
executive interference. Nevertheless, the difference between an interfering enactment and a non-interfering enactment, particularly given the four factors outlined
above, is more discernible than the difference between a “major” enactment and a
“minor” enactment, a “jurisdictional” decision and a “non-jurisdictional” decision, or an “excessive” delegation and a “reasonable” delegation. It is also at least
as easy to perceive as the excessive politicization of executive decision-making
that might justify the Massachusetts rule.
And, ultimately, the non-interference principle is valuable enough to justify even an imperfect judicial doctrine.
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VI. CONCLUSION
Although Chevron empowers the executive branch to “say what the law
is,”184 it does not bestow exclusive policymaking authority in administrative agencies. Congress, of course, retains the power to legislate, even in those regulatory
regimes that it has entrusted partially or fully to the executive. Chevron, thus, enshrines a system of overlapping policymaking authority. In any such system, there
is substantial risk that competing institutions will interfere with each other’s work,
and in any such system, there must be some rule for choosing between competing
institutions.
In the Chevron context, courts should vacate interfering agency interpretations, not because they are unlawful, but simply because they raise overall lawmaking costs by forcing Congress to rethink and reformulate a regulatory strategy
in which it has already invested substantial resources. Judicial invalidation of
meddlesome administrative actions, thus, is necessary in individual cases to restore a status quo ante so that congressional bargaining can pick up where it left
off, and a non-interference rule would be systemically beneficial if it created a
disincentive for administrative agencies to enter regulatory domains in which
Congress is already acting.
Overall, the non-interference understanding of the “major questions” cases
is not just descriptively accurate; it creates a discrete exception to Chevron deference that is both theoretically and instrumentally justified. Although the bare majorness, nonaggrandizement, and nondelegation accounts fail to justify the “major
questions” exception, the exception should nevertheless be reincarnated—and
Massachusetts should nevertheless be killed. They rule is necessary as a doctrine
of non-interference.
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